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ABSTRACT
For decades, governmental institutions have focused on improving and equalizing
the educational opportunities for students. Courts, legislatures, and chief executive
officers at federal and state levels have spearheaded a range of large-scale educational
reform efforts, including desegregation, school finance reform, educational
improvement for students with disabilities, charter schools, and standards-based
accountability systems. However, many assessments of these efforts reflect limited or
mixed success. This Article takes a bird’s-eye view examination of not simply why a
single type of educational reform has failed to reach its goals in a particular area, but
instead at why such efforts have failed to reach their goals more generally. Drawing
insights from both the history of these reform efforts and educational research, this
Article analyzes cross-cutting challenges from a perspective that highlights the
horizontal and vertical governance structures underlying these reforms. Based on the
analysis of these reforms, this Article presents principles for rethinking educational
governance in a way that has a greater potential for equalizing and improving students’
learning opportunities and performance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over a number of decades, our governmental institutions—courts, legislatures, and
chief executive officers at federal and state levels—have advocated numerous
educational reforms. These include efforts to desegregate schools, revise school
finance systems, improve the education of students with disabilities, and introduce
alternatives to traditional public schools (e.g., charter schools). Proposed changes have
approached the problems facing schools in different ways and with different theories
of action. Some are centered on students’ rights and deficiencies of resources provided
by the government, while others emphasize a systems approach to reform. Still, some
have turned to the market as an engine for educational change on a theory that
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government fundamentally lacks the capacity to address needed improvements or
reforms.
Despite this ongoing churn of reform, sober assessments of these efforts range
from dismal to limited success. School desegregation, perhaps the most visible and
foundational large-scale educational reform effort, has fallen far short of its goal.1 As
Professor Heise argued, “the Court’s successful defeat of de jure school desegregation
did not translate into a defeat of de facto segregation.”2 Scholarly assessments of
large-scale educational reform efforts as a whole yield similar results.3 Recognition of
the limitations of educational change have even begun to appear in the popular press
as newspapers, such as the New York Times, have highlighted disappointing
performance and widening achievement gaps among U.S. students in international
tests.4 Moreover, the constant barrage of new reform ideas and efforts has resulted in

1 See, e.g., CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 181 (2004) (discussing the legal and demographic forces that restrained
interracial contact); Erica Frankenberg, The Role of Residential Segregation in Contemporary
School Segregation, 45 EDUC. AND URB. SOC’Y 548, 548 (2013) (analyzing the relationship
between residential and school segregation); Gary Orfield & Erica Frankenberg, Increasingly
Segregated and Unequal Schools as Courts Reverse Policy, 50 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 718, 719
(2014) (analyzing legal changes and data on changing demographics and intensifying
segregation).
2 See Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2424
(2004).
3 See BENJAMIN M. SUPERFINE, EQUALITY IN EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY: 1954–2010, at 8
(2013) (“[D]espite the significant resources accompanying intensive judicial and legislative
efforts to equalize educational opportunities, these efforts have often failed to achieve their
goals.”).
4 See Dana Goldstein, ‘It Just Isn’t Working’: PISA Test Scores Cast Doubt on U.S. Education
Efforts., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/us/us-studentsinternational-test-scores.html (“Low-performing students have been the focus of decades of
bipartisan education overhaul efforts, costing many billions of dollars, that have resulted in a
string of national programs . . . but uneven results.”). The test results further indicated that the
reading achievement gap is widening between low and high performers, specifically because
the bottom 10th percentile lost ground.
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a system described as “fragmented”5 and filled with “faddish”6 education policies that
come and go.7
Responding to such challenges, legal scholars have proposed a range of solutions.
For example, they have argued for the recognition of a federal right to education in
the U.S. Constitution;8 the explicit creation of such a right by statute9 or constitutional
amendment;10 overturning particularly important educational cases; 11 molding
litigation or statutes toward what are viewed as more promising areas of reform, such

5 Several scholars have focused on the problems that arise from incoherent or fragmented
education policies and have generally argued that policymakers should focus on creating more
coherent legal and policy arrangements. See, e.g., David K. Cohen et al., The Influence of
Practice on Policy, in SHAPING EDUCATION POLICY: POWER AND PROCESS 63, 67 (Douglas E.
Mitchell et al. eds., 2011) (discussing the relationship between federalism, educational
governance, and the resulting problems plaguing efforts aimed at influencing educational
practice); Jennifer A. O’Day & Marshall S. Smith, Systemic Reform and Educational
Opportunity, in DESIGNING COHERENT EDUCATION POLICY 250 (Susan H. Fuhrman ed., 1993)
(proposing “systemic reform” as a remedy to the problems of legal and policy incoherence).
6 See Brian Rowan, The School Improvement Industry in the United States: Why Educational
Change is Both Pervasive and Ineffectual, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN EDUCATION 67, 67
(Heinz-Dieter Meyer & Brian Rowan eds., 2006) (discussing why instruction and educational
outcomes had changed little for at least a decade despite systemic approaches to reform).
7 See Gary Orfield, Strengthening Title I: Designing a Policy Based on Evidence, in HARD
WORK FOR GOOD SCHOOLS: FACTS NOT FADS IN TITLE I REFORM 4 (Gary Orfield & Elizabeth
H. DeBray eds., 2001) (explaining the failure of various educational reforms to close racial
disparities).
8 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 111, 111–13 (arguing that a fundamental right to education in the U.S. Constitution is
critical for addressing educational problems); Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right
to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 94 (2013) (arguing that the U.S.
Constitution should be interpreted to include a right to an adequate education).
9 See, e.g., Kimberly J. Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model for a
Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1712 (2007) (arguing that Congress
should enact spending legislation guaranteeing a federal right to education).
10 See Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The
First Step toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343,
1381 (2010) (discussing efforts to amend the U.S. Constitution to provide a federal right to
education).
11 See, e.g., Christopher R. Lockard, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past, Present, and
Future of Education Finance Litigation in California, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 420–21 (2005)
(advocating for the Supreme Court to overrule San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), a fundamental school finance decision).
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as enhancing students’ literacy12 or preschool opportunities;13 and reconstructing
educational federalism more generally.14 While such proposals are based on a detailed
understanding of the legal environment, they generally have been limited by
insufficient attention to the empirical research that highlights the complicated range
of factors and interactions among them that influence law and policy change in
education. Indeed, we need educational reform that not only promotes significant
changes in law and policy, but also improves and equalizes the learning opportunities
for and performance of students at the classroom level, which is what ultimately
matters.
This Article accordingly takes a bird’s-eye view examination of not simply why a
single type of educational reform has failed to reach its goals in a particular area, but
instead at why such efforts have failed to reach their goals more generally. Based in
both a detailed understanding of the law and empirical research, this Article argues
that, while each major educational reform area has been beset by unique challenges,
some types of educational problems are so systemic that they cross reform efforts.
These cross-cutting challenges are most usefully conceptualized in terms of
educational governance. Such a conceptualization operates at the level of the
fundamental structure framing various educational reform efforts, throws empirically
identified problems into stark relief, and is addressable on a practical level through the
law.
This Article particularly argues that educational governance should be considered
in two major ways to best understand the types of central challenges that span across
reform efforts. First, educational governance should be considered horizontally, or
involving the explicit or implicit choice to seek reform through various alternative
institutions at the same general level, like federal courts or legislatures. 15 Second,
educational governance should be considered vertically, or from governing
institutions like federal and state governmental institutions to law and policy
implementers, like school administrators or teachers. It is at this level that any victory
or reform achieved at the horizontal level will be implemented. Some have referred to
such a view of educational governance as “from the capitol to the classroom.”16
12 See William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of the Next Generation
of Educational Rights Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1919 (2017) (framing cases
focused on enhancing students’ literacy opportunities as “next-generation resource
litigation[s]”).
13 See James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49, 77 (2006)
(“[P]reschool may be one of the most cost-effective and efficient inputs that a court could
order.”).
14 See Kimberly J. Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 959,
983 (2015) (“Education federalism should be restructured to embrace greater federal leadership
and responsibility for a national effort to provide equal access to an excellent education.”).
15 See NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 27 (1994) (discussing a comparative institutional analysis
approach to foreground the role of governance in law and policy problems).
16 See CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, FROM THE CAPITAL TO THE CLASSROOM: YEAR 2 OF THE NO
CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT i, xi–xii (2004) (articulating various levels from the federal through
school levels to be examined when charting education policy implementation).
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Indeed, this type of focus on governance not only highlights major obstacles facing
reform efforts but efficacious paths for change as well.
To examine the fundamental challenges to educational reform efforts and the
governance issues they raise, this Article is divided into four primary Parts. First, this
Article offers a theory of educational governance grounded in both the law and
empirical research on educational policy. Second, this Article employs this theory of
governance to analyze four major areas of large-scale educational reform: school
finance reform, education of students with disabilities, standards-based accountability
policies, and charter schools. This Part highlights the applicable law and institutional
context in which the reforms have occurred, and what we know about the successes
and challenges of these reforms. Third, this Article articulates implications about the
operation of educational governance across educational reform areas and offers
principles for how educational governance should be restructured to promote more
efficacious efforts moving forward. Finally, this Article offers concluding thoughts
about the necessity of educational governance reconceptualization and reform.
Still, it is worth noting that any recommendations for improving large-scale
education reform should be given with a sense of modesty. As this Article discusses
throughout, effective and sustainable education reform through law and policy faces
significant challenges of design and implementation. As decades of research reveal,
no “magic potion” for improving and equalizing students’ learning opportunities and
performance exists. In addition to the many challenges this Article highlights,
education is inextricably intertwined with a handful of other policy areas, such as
health, economics, housing, and voting.17 Moreover, no plan for sweeping educational
reform can be designed, introduced, and implemented effectively unless the political
context is ripe.18 Still, promoting effective, large-scale educational reform requires a
clear-eyed view of the major challenges educational reform efforts have faced in the
past, which are precisely the sorts of challenges this Article examines.
II. A THEORY OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE
While several challenges have historically plagued large-scale educational reform
efforts in law and policy, some of the most important challenges can be usefully

17 See Public Health and Education: Working Collaboratively Across Sectors to Improve
High School Graduation as a Means to Eliminate Health Disparities, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N
(Nov.
9,
2010),
https://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policystatements/policy-database/2014/07/09/14/35/public-health-and-education-workingcollaboratively-across-sectors-to-improve-high-school-graduation (“Health and education are
inextricably intertwined, and a lack of education is one of the social determinants of poor
health.”); JEAN ANYON, RADICAL POSSIBILITIES: PUBLIC POLICY, URBAN EDUCATION, AND A
NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT 7–10 (2005) (discussing the relationship between policies involving
poverty, housing, transportation, residential segregation, and education). See also Bruce
Meredith & Mark Paige, Reversing Rodriguez: A Siren Call to a Dangerous Shoal, 58 HOUSE
L. REV. 355, 384 (2020) (arguing that securing voting rights is an important, but often
overlooked, path to education reform because it will create the type of political will to change
the interconnected policy areas that impact educational opportunity, such as housing and health
care).
18 See, e.g., Lorraine M. McDonnell, A Political Science Perspective on Education Policy
Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH 57, 57 (Gary Sykes et al. eds., 2009)
(providing an overview of how politics influence education policy design).
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described in terms of educational governance, the oversight of public education by
government institutions. Such challenges are both systemic and cut across reform
efforts. This Part draws on legal and empirical literature to conceptualize educational
governance horizontally and vertically, and it provides a foundation for the analysis
of specific education reform efforts and underlying factors that have influenced them.
A.

Horizontal Governance

When legal scholars refer to educational governance, they sometimes refer to it in
the horizontal sense. That is, they generally conceptualize it in terms of allocating
legal decision-making authority to different governmental institutions at
approximately the same level, like courts, legislatures, or the head of the executive
branch.19 In doing so, scholars have highlighted persistent educational reform
challenges plaguing certain institutions. For example, unproductive politics have
weakened legislative attempts at educational reform in cases involving test-based
accountability,20 while the lack of clearly defined educational rights at federal21 and
state22 levels, in addition to the lack of scientific expertise,23 have weakened school
finance reform litigation in the courts. However, such challenges are neither
considered simultaneously nor relatively.
Institutional choice theory offers an approach for strategically considering such
challenges when crafting an educational reform strategy.24 As Professor Komesar
argued, because different institutions like courts and legislatures have different
characteristics with regard to particular policy issues, “deciding who decides”
constitutes one of the most important, though often unrecognized, issues in the
educational policy process.25 When reformers ignore the influence of institutional

19 See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 502 (2005) (discussing
how power is allocated in the same governmental “tier”).
20 See Charles Barone & Elizabeth DeBray, The Role of Congress in Education Policy, EDUC.
WK. (May 2, 2012), https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/opinion-the-role-of-congress-ineducation-policy/2012/05.
21 See KIMBERLY JENKINS ROBINSON, A FEDERAL RIGHT
QUESTIONS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY 2 (2019).

TO

EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL

22 See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48
VAND. L. REV. 101, 104–66 (providing a detailed overview of different school funding schemes
and relevant state constitutional provisions).
23 See Molly S. McUsic, The Law’s Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY 88, 91 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999) (arguing for the use of
standards in school finance lawsuits because it enables courts to rely on “polic[ies] established
by education experts”).
24 See KOMESAR, supra note 15, at 5 (discussing the characteristics of various institutions for
the purpose of making policy decisions).
25 See Benjamin M. Superfine, Deciding Who Decides Questions at the Intersection of School
Finance Litigation and Standards-Based Accountability Policies, 23 EDUC. POL’Y 480, 482
(2009) (applying institutional choice theory to educational policy questions).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

7

568

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[70:561

context on the accomplishment of specific policy goals, like equalizing educational
opportunities for students, they miss a critical element shaping how policies are
designed and implemented, as well as their ultimate effectiveness. Highlighting that
no single institution is perfect for any particular issue and wisely displaying a sense of
modesty toward a complex area, Komesar also argued that “the choice is always a
choice among highly imperfect alternatives.”26
Given the courts’ highly visible role in education reform, scholars noted the courts’
institutional strengths and limitations, finding a muddled record of success. Citing
issues such as courts’ limited abilities to oversee implementation of their rulings and
the requirement to take only cases that come to them, Professor Rosenberg argued,
“U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform” in
areas including education.27 Moreover, although the courts have some tools to help
them sort through technical matters of educational policy, they have also faced many
challenges understanding scientific arguments undergirding factual claims. 28 Perhaps
most obviously, the relevant legal rules and principles guiding judicial decisionmaking in education cases—or lack thereof—can limit courts’ abilities to leverage
particular types of reform.29 As discussed below, such challenges have weakened
courts’ reform capacity in areas ranging from the education of students with
disabilities to school finance reform. Prompted by these obstacles, some
commentators specifically have advocated for a federal right to education to guide
judicial decision-making.
Still, the courts can be a very useful venue for bringing large-scale education
reform claims in particular instances. Given their comparative insulation from the
political process and the impetus to craft reasoned decisions following the law, courts
can offer reformers a potential means to overcome political inertia and affect
governmental decision-making in education, particularly for underserved minority
groups without significant political power.30 As such, the courts have brought
legitimacy to efforts to address educational problems that might not otherwise have
been addressed at all.31

26 See KOMESAR, supra note 15, at 5.
27 See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
CHANGE? 422 (2d ed. 2008).

ABOUT

SOCIAL

28 See Kevin G. Welner & Haggai Kupermintz, Rethinking Expert Testimony in Education
Rights Litigation, 26 EDUC. EVALUATION AND POL’Y ANALYSIS 127, 132–40 (2004) (arguing
that courts may be led into a false sense of security about claimed facts in education litigation).
29 See discussion infra Part III.
30 See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement: The Remedies
Problem Posed by Sheff v. O’Neill—And a Proposed Solution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1115, 1146
(1997) (describing the use of the courts in school finance reform litigation to effectively
influence educational policy). But see Kevin G. Welner, Scholars as Policy Actors: Research,
Public Discourse, and the Zone of Judicial Constraints, 49 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 7, 7 (analyzing
the role of popular sentiment and political pressure in education litigation).
31 See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF
CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2004) (generally describing the impact of Brown
I).
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In contrast, legislatures possess much more flexibility in their decision-making
processes and have access to a wider range of information. In addition to the power of
legislators to interact with various interest groups and interested parties on informal
bases, legislatures have looser rules than courts for presenting and receiving
information.32 As such, they are often well positioned for making decisions that
depend on an array of complex information, balancing competing political interests,
and crafting complex reform packages. However, they are also comparatively more
subject to the vagaries of the political process, such as pressure from powerful political
minorities (e.g., interest groups) or powerful majorities (e.g., unusually motivated
voters).33 Moreover, legislatures too may have issues dealing with scientific evidence
(in contrast to, say, agencies).34 As discussed below, legislatures have produced
striking examples of ineffective and harmful educational reform based on inherently
flawed theories of action grounded more in politics than social science, such as the
sweeping testing and accountability provisions of the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001.35
Of course, there are several more institutions that are critical to consider in public
policy and particularly education law and policy. Various executive branch
institutions, such as the presidency, governorships, and agencies, are all critical
components of educational governance. Given the prevalence of charter schools and
vouchers, one could even argue that market should be seen as its own institution for
an institutional choice theory analysis. This Article will address such other institutions
throughout. However, given the centrality of courts and legislatures in large-scale
education reform, these institutions constitute the focus of this Article’s analysis.
In short, a major lesson from institutional choice theory may exhort reformers to
be strategic about the institution (or mix of institutions) through which they attempt to
push reform to effectively cut through the political process and draw on expertise to
craft nuanced reform packages. However, as the following Part illustrates, it is also
critical not to fall into the trap of believing that achieving even a significant victory in
any institution results in frictionless implementation of efficacious reform that
automatically equalizes and increases students’ learning opportunities. Indeed, while
expertise is critical in education, it is not a field where one could find “philosopher
kings” that effectively operate through wise, top-down rule.36

32 See KOMESAR, supra note 15, at 141–42 (“The tradeoff is between a political process that
integrates far more information but with a more significant risk of bias and an adjudicative
process that suppresses information but decreases distortions in its presentation. The
adjudicative process hears and considers less, but is more evenhanded in what it . . . considers.”).
33 See id.
34 See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1176 (1999) (“[L]egislatures in many states suffer
from numerous institutional deficits that affect their ability to focus on complex issues in a
sustained and informed manner.”).
35 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6316.
36 See KARL POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM X, 42 (2013) (discussing the political
philosophy of Plato).
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Vertical Governance

Although a favorable court decision or passage of a law is arguably a necessary
part of large-scale education reform and often seen as a critical victory, actual change
for students resulting from these sorts of wins is far from guaranteed.37 While it might
be particularly tempting for lawyers to frame victories in such a fashion, educational
policy research highlights the many challenges of effective educational reform as it is
implemented “from the capitol to the classroom.” 38 As such research repeatedly
illustrates, effective educational reform is not simply a matter of telling practitioners
what to do at various levels and then holding them accountable; it is a complex process
that involves the application of professional discretion at multiple levels and thus
implicit decisions about how to divide decision-making authority “vertically” from
policymakers to teachers.39
Myriad factors alter the path of any reform as it moves from governmental
institutions into the classroom. For example, administrative structures and norms in
the various organizations and institutions through which reforms gestate—such as
state departments of education and school districts—can block or facilitate even the
best-intentioned changes.40 Individuals within organizations interpret legal and policy
signals to decide whether and/or how to ignore, adapt, or adopt reforms in practice. 41
School-level factors are also critical, as variation in the implementation of reform at
the school level is the norm rather than the exception.42 In response to factors such as
the will and skill of school leaders, and how policies fit with existing practices, norms,
and goals of schools, schools construct different interpretations of how reforms should
be enacted and accordingly which components should be emphasized.43 Teachers and

37 Indeed, as we note, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) is an excellent
example of a much-heralded decision failing to achieve its goals. See CLOTFELTER, supra note
1, at 201.
38 See, e.g., CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, FROM THE CAPITAL TO THE CLASSROOM: YEAR 4 OF THE
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT (2006) (generally examining federal, state, and local
implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act).
39 See SUPERFINE, supra note 3, at 31–34 (discussing the institutional, organizational, and
individual level factors influencing education policy implementation).
40 Id.
41 See James P. Spillane, Cognition and Policy Implementation: District Policymakers and
the Reform of Mathematics Education, 18 COGNITION AND INSTRUCTION 141, 142 (2000)
(examining how educational practitioners interpret and act on policy and legal signals).
42 See Jennifer A. Mueller & Katherine H. Hoyde, Theme and Variation in the Enactment of
Reform: Case Studies, in THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP: UNDERSTANDING REFORM IN HIGH
SCHOOLS 21 (Jonathan A. Supovitz & Elliot H. Weinbaum eds. 2008) (highlighting the
inescapability of variation in educational policy implementation).
43 See id. at 42 (surveying the types of variation in the implementation of educational reforms
across different schools).
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local administrators act as “street level bureaucrats” and arguably are the most
important actors in the education policy process.44
Local adaptation and implementation of reform to local context, which can differ
across states, districts, schools, and even classrooms, is critical for success. As
Professor Bryk and colleagues argued, education reform efforts should “move away
from simplistic thinking about solutions in terms of “‘What Works?’” toward a more
realistic appraisal of “What works, for whom, and under what conditions?”45 Indeed,
even “scientifically-based” reforms must undergo adaptations that are faithful to their
underlying principles as they move to different contexts. 46 Given the range of factors
influencing education reform implementation, such adaptation requires the active
application of professional discretion at all levels of the education policy process from
the capitol to the classroom.
To be sure, some education reforms are simply designed poorly and virtually
destined to fail. As discussed below, the stringent test-based accountability provisions
of No Child Left Behind were based on a flawed theory of action about school
improvement—that unrelenting evaluation, punitive measures, and pressure from
outside forces would change educational conditions in schools and classrooms. This
theory was based more in politics and ideology than in evidence about effective
educational reform.47 As a result, the law failed to promote positive change in
students’ learning opportunities and exacerbated existing equity issues. Even if
practitioners respond to such flawed legal and policy signals with “fidelity,” the
likelihood for effective educational reform would be small at best.
However, other sorts of reforms have a better chance of success. While more
funding might not improve conditions at the classroom level with as much consistency
as one might hope, the wise use of extra resources in relation to local problems of
practice could certainly be productive.48 Indeed, what it would take to strategically
promote such decision-making at all levels is precisely the question of vertical
governance. In the following Parts, this Article traces how major educational reforms
have fared with a direct eye toward issues of horizontal and vertical governance, and
what it might take to strengthen the fundamental structure in which education reform
sits.

44 See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES 3 (1980) (coining the term “street-level bureaucrats” to describe the
importance of ground-level policy implementers).
45 See ANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., LEARNING TO IMPROVE: HOW AMERICA’S SCHOOLS CAN GET
BETTER AT GETTING BETTER 11 (2015) (articulating the theoretical underpinnings for
educational reform using improvement science principles).
46 See William R. Penuel et al., Organizing Research and Development at the Intersection of
Learning, Implementation, and Design, 40 EDUC. RES. 331 (2011) (arguing for the utility of
design research to support productive adaptation as reforms go to scale).
47 See infra notes 175–180.
48 See infra notes 80–90.
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III. MAJOR LARGE-SCALE EDUCATION REFORMS
A.

School Finance Litigation and Policy

School finance reform has long been a primary area of education reform aimed at
increasing and equalizing students’ educational opportunities. This area is particularly
useful to examine because it spans across governmental institutions and involves
efforts situated at the highest levels of state government to influence students’ learning
opportunities. Appearing in the wake of desegregation litigation, school finance
reform litigation emerged in the late 1960s and has appeared in at least 45 states. 49
Because local property value or wealth has generally been the major driver of school
funding, significant per pupil spending differences have consistently emerged across
school districts and states.50 Reformers accordingly have focused on using the courts
to change this structure by equalizing and increasing funding allocated to the education
of students in less wealthy districts. When plaintiffs win, courts largely issue orders to
state legislatures to modify school funding formulas with the hope that students’
learning opportunities and performance will be augmented and equalized.51
Scholars have described the early history of school finance litigation as appearing
in three waves.52 Following the trail blazed by desegregation cases, the first wave of
school finance cases appeared in federal court and featured arguments that educational
funds must be provided equally to all students under the 14th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.53 However, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
the Supreme Court found that the 14th Amendment does not provide a valid basis for
challenging funding differences across school districts.54 The Court specifically found
that education is not a fundamental right and wealth is not a suspect class, and
accordingly applied the rational basis test instead of strict scrutiny.55 Directly
attending to issues of vertical governance, the Court further stated that it lacks
expertise in education policy issues, and states and local school boards are better

49 See A Project of the Center for Educational Equity at Teachers College,
SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, http://schoolfunding.info (last visited Feb. 24, 2022).
50 See Koski, supra note 12, at 1901–07 (discussing the basis for the various waves of school
finance litigation).
51 See id.
52 See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas
Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. EDUC. 219, 222
(1990). Thro suggested the metaphor of “waves” to describe the history of school finance
litigation. While this metaphor is useful for summarizing the early history of this litigation in
short form, it is important to note that the idea of waves to describe school finance litigation is
arguably imperfect. See William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A
Re-Examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1193 (2003).
53 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
54 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (“[W]e find neither the
suspect-classification nor the fundamental-interest analysis persuasive.”).
55 See id. at 35.
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positioned to address complex educational issues that differ across local areas. 56 The
Court therefore concluded that the 14th Amendment does not constitute a viable basis
for equalizing school funding differences.57
Following Rodriguez, reformers litigated school finance cases in state courts in the
second wave through the end of the 1980s, primarily arguing that educational funds
must be provided equally to all students under the equal protection clauses of state
constitutions.58 However, plaintiffs experienced only limited success in these cases.
State supreme courts often faced much difficulty defining “equality,” continued to
express that making such decisions would require them to delve too deeply into the
inner workings of local schools, and often followed the Supreme Court’s general
reasoning in Rodriguez about the limits of equal protection.59 Focused on horizontal
governance, many state cases have turned on the non-justiciable political question
doctrine, which provides that courts should not decide on issues more appropriately
left to another governmental branch.60 Courts relying on this doctrine have found that
defining an adequate or equal education with specificity would require courts to
articulate standards that are neither judicially discoverable nor manageable, and they
have therefore dismissed school finance cases.61 Indeed, even where plaintiffs
prevailed in such lawsuits, courts often crafted vague remedies, necessitating
legislative action. Consequently, legislatures faced strong pressure from local districts
not to interfere in the governance of schools. As a result, legislatures often failed to
engage in significant reform even under court order.62
Beginning in the early 1990s, third-wave cases emerged in state courts, that instead
focused on arguments that students should receive “adequate” educations under state

56 See id. at 32 (“[T]his Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels
against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels.”).
57 See id. at 1.
58 Most state constitutions contain their own equal protection clauses, which often include
language very similar to the federal Equal Protection Clause. See Robert F. Williams, Equality
Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (1985).
59 See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”:
From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1151, 1159–62 (1995) (analyzing the strengths
and limitations of second wave school finance cases).
60 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (articulating six criteria to determine whether
a case involves a non-justiciable political question and particularly indicating that courts should
not rule on issues where there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards).
61 See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rts. v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); Coal. For Adequacy
and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996); Danson v. Casey, 399
A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979).
62 See, e.g., Jennifer Imazeki & Andrew Reschovsky, School Finance Reform in Texas: A
Never-Ending Story?, in HELPING CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: STATE AID AND THE PURSUIT OF
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 251, 252 (John Yonger ed., 2004) (examining the history of school
finance reform in Texas); Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial
Power in the Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1034–48 (2006)
(describing the history of school finance reform litigation and legislation in Kansas).
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constitutions’ education clauses, which require states to provide students with a
“sound basic” education, “thorough and efficient” education, or something similar.63
Such arguments were more successful for several reasons, such as their tendency to
generate less political opposition than those focused more narrowly on equality and
reliance on education clauses instead of equal protection clauses. 64 Moreover, these
cases allowed courts an opportunity to creatively grapple with difficult governance
issues that emerged in second-wave cases. In response to the challenges of defining
equality and perception of judicial expertise, several state courts have looked to
legislatively mandated student learning standards to articulate precisely what an
education clause requires.65 In addition to fleshing out the meaning of educational
adequacy, standards are generally aligned with assessments that can provide a wealth
of evidence about student learning directly in relation to such standards.66 While such
courts have not gone so far as to cite standards as the final word on educational
adequacy, because doing so would arguably cede power to the legislative branch to
define constitutional requirements, courts repeatedly have construed standards as a
useful resource.67
Courts crafting remedial orders in school finance cases similarly have been most
successful when working in coordination with other governmental branches. Instead
of dictating precisely how legislatures should modify their states’ school funding
systems, courts have been most effective in promoting changes to states’ school
funding structures when they have given legislatures meaningful targets without
dictating means. As such, school finance decisions have been most effective when

63 See Enrich, supra note 22, at 106.
64 See Heise, supra note 59, at 1168 (analyzing how adequacy arguments responded to
weaknesses in equity arguments in school finance litigation).
65 See James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1223, 1224 (2008) (describing how state standards can conceptually help courts define
equality).
66 See, e.g., Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 WL 877984, at *126 (Mass. Super Ct.,
Apr. 26, 2004) (repeatedly reviewing student performance on assessments aligned to standards);
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (N.C. 1997) (“Another factor which may properly be
considered in this determination is the level of performance of the children of the state and its
various districts on standard achievement tests.”).
67 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 484 (N.Y. Sup. 2001)
(closely examining student performance against standards but stating “the court must heed the
Court of Appeals’ direction to use the new standards with ‘prudence’”); Hancock, 2004 WL
877984, at *16, rev’d, Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005) (“We shall
presume at this time that the Commonwealth will fulfil [sic] its responsibility with respect to
defining the specifics and the appropriate means to provide the constitutionally required
education.” (quoting McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Off. of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass.
1993)); Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 326 Mont. 304, 312 (2005) “Unless
funding relates to needs such as academic standards, teacher pay, fixed costs, costs of special
education, and performance standards, then the funding is not related to the cornerstones of a
quality education.”).
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they have served as “policy blueprints” for legislative action.68 Indeed, many scholars
have highlighted the utility of school finance reform litigation that positions the courts
as institutions overseeing reform instead of serving as top-down decision-makers.69
In this reform role, courts set agendas, engage in ongoing negotiations with
stakeholders and use accountability systems defined by non-judicial entities. This
approach is fluid, changing as the content of reforms developed by nonjudicial
institutions moves in line with shifting reform goals.
When courts in school finance cases take this approach, they display sensitivity to
issues of horizontal governance. This sensitivity recognizes courts’ lack of expertise
and capacity to manage every detail of reform while foregrounding courts’ abilities to
cut through politics preventing reform, particularly when such reform is well-suited to
address underserved groups’ needs and likely requires politically challenging funding
redistribution. However, as discussed above, getting “right” the institutional
arrangements is only the first step in creating meaningful reform for students.
1.

Recent Developments in School Finance Litigation

Although school finance litigation has largely focused on restructuring states’
school funding systems, courts have more recently focused on specific reform
strategies that move closer to instruction. As discussed below, school finance litigation
has persisted for years in some states as legislatures and courts took turns responding
to each other, and some courts have begun to highlight this problem in their
decisions.70 Moreover, there has been limited evidence that court orders consistently
improved or equalized student learning opportunities or performance. Accordingly,
some courts have ordered states to channel funds into specific reform strategies.
For example, state courts hearing school finance cases since the late 1990s have
ordered the implementation of class size reduction programs,71 whole school
reforms,72 and free preschool programs.73 More recently, plaintiffs have gone back to
68 See DOUGLAS REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 171 (2001).
69 See, e.g., James F. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewy Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 183, 192 (2003) (characterizing such reform as “non-court-centric”); Charles
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1019 (2004) (characterizing such reform as “experimentalist”).
70 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 349 (N.Y. 2003)
(stating that the court was attempting to “learn from our national experience and fashion an
outcome that will address the constitutional violation instead of inviting decades of litigation”).
71 Courts have ordered the implementation of class size reduction programs in at least two
states. See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 514 (N.J. 1998); Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State,
907 P.2d 1238, 1278 (Wyo. 1998).
72 Courts have ordered the implementation of whole school reform programs in at least one
case. See Abbott, 710 A.2d. at 460.
73 Courts have ordered free preschool for children in at least five cases. See Lake View Sch.
Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 257 S.W.3d 879 (Ark. 2005); Abbot, 710 A.2d at 462; Hancock v.
Driscoll, 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1157 (Mass. 2005); Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No.
95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *100 (N.C. Super. Oct. 12, 2000); Abbeville Cnty. Sch.
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federal court with 14th Amendment claims structured in similar ways as first wave
school finance litigation to argue for particular reforms, such as stronger literacy 74 and
civics education75 programs for underserved and minority students. Such cases are
aimed at establishing new educational rights with enhanced precision under the U.S.
Constitution, such as the right of “access to literacy.”76 As in many traditional school
finance cases, plaintiffs in these newer cases have grounded their arguments in
documentation abut a range of deplorable educational conditions in students’
schools77 often persisting in light of ineffective legislative responses sometimes
spanning years.78
From a governance standpoint, such moves are particularly notable because they
center much decision-making power in the court to determine the “best” use of funds
and oversee their implementation. On one hand, these types of moves seem to make
much sense—such strategies appear promising, are directly aimed at influencing
students’ educational opportunities, and could result in precise orders to states. On the
other hand, they require courts to make difficult decisions about the desirability and
appropriateness of reform strategies in the face of complex educational evidence. As
the North Carolina Supreme Court stated in a school finance case regarding the idea
of free preschool, “a single or definitive means for achieving constitutional
compliance . . . has yet to surface from the depths of the evidentiary sea.”79 As such,
these moves are grounded in a theory of action that assumes the courts can not only
select an appropriate educational reform strategy, but also oversee one sufficiently
well to ensure its effective implementation across various administrative levels and
down to schools and classrooms that exist in inevitably varying contexts.
2.

Empirical Research on School Finance Reform

Although school funding has been the subject of significant scholarly attention
over the decades, research on the effects of school funding is mixed and ultimately
limited. In the 1990s, researchers directly debated the question of whether “money
matters” in the pages of high-profile educational research journals and particularly

Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 191 (S.C. 2014).
74 See Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d. 616, 649 (6th Cir. 2020).
75 See A.C. v. Raimondo, 94 F. Supp. 3d 170, 174 (D.R.I. 2020).
76 See Gary B., 957 F.3d. at 624 (“The core of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that the conditions in
their schools are so bad–due to the absence of qualified teachers, crumbling facilities, and
insufficient materials–that those schools fail to provide access to literacy.”).
77 For example, the plaintiffs in Gary B. v. Whitmer highlighted issues such as the lack of
evidence-based literacy instruction and intervention programs, insufficient curriculum
materials, unsafe physical conditions, and unqualified teaching staff. Complaint at 132, Gary B.
v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d. 616 (6th Cir. 2020) (Nos. 18-1855, 18-1871).
78 See Gary B., 957 F.3d. at 621–24 (discussing the history of Detroit schools and state
control).
79 Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 394–95 (N.C. 2004).
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critiqued each other’s work on methodological grounds. 80 Still, even the strongest
opponents of the idea that there is a strong relationship between school funding and
student performance have concluded that money likely matters if it is wisely spent. 81
Moreover, there is arguably some consensus that student performance has risen as a
result of school funding decisions and increases in school funding, particularly in the
case of students living in poverty.82
However, research currently provides few clear and consistent recommendations
about how educational resources should be deployed to effectively boost school
performance or student learning opportunities, or achieve other specific results, such
as increasing graduation rates.83 While several courts and legislatures have ordered
cost studies for making decisions about educational funding, some researchers have
labeled these studies as politicized and grounded in unscientific methods.84 Moreover,
while researchers have underscored that we are learning more about the various types
of strategies that can increase educational opportunities,85 there are few studies

80 For arguments that money does not matter, see Eric A. Hanushek, The Impact of
Differential Expenditures on School Performance, EDUC. RESEARCHER, May 1989, at 45, 49
(conducting a meta-analysis of school finance studies); Eric A. Hanushek, Money Might Matter
Somewhere: A Response to Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald, EDUC. RESEARCHER, May 1994, at
5, 8 (defending a meta-analysis of school finance studies). For arguments that money does
matter, see Larry V. Hedges et al., Does Money Matter? A Meta-Analysis of Studies of the
Effects of Differential School Inputs on Students Outcomes, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Apr. 1994, at
5, 13 (conducting a meta-analysis of school finance studies); Larry V. Hedges et al., Money
Does Matter Somewhere: A Reply to Hanushek, EDUC. RESEARCHER, May 1994, at 9, 10
(defending a meta-analysis of school finance studies).
81 See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, The Quest for Equalized Mediocrity: School Finance Reform
without Consideration of School Performance, in WHERE DOES THE MONEY GO? RESOURCE
ALLOCATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL 20, 37–38 (Lawrence O. Picus & James
L. Wattenbarger eds., 1996) (“[M]oney spent wisely, logically, and with accountability would
be very useful indeed.”).
82 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. MATHIS, NAT’L EDUC. POL’Y CTR., DOES MONEY MATTER? 3 (2016),
https://nepc.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Mathis%20RBOPM8%20Money%20Matters.pdf.
83 See Steven W. Raudenbush, Learning from Attempts to Improve Schooling: The
Contribution of Methodological Diversity, EDUC. RESEARCHER, June 2005, at 25, 26
(“Knowledge about how to use resources in instruction is key, yet woefully lacking.”); Maris
Vinovskis, Missed Opportunities: Why the Federal Response to a Nation at Risk Was
Inadequate, in A NATION REFORMED? 115, 130 (David T. Gordon ed., 2003) (highlighting the
lack of a research base for educational policy decision-making).
84 See William Duncombe, Responding to the Charge of Alchemy: Strategies for Evaluating
the Reliability of Costing-out Research, 32 J. EDUC. FIN. 137, 138 (2006) (arguing that costing
out research “should move away from the advocacy environment to the realm of social science
research, where methods can be evaluated without pressure to produce only one answer”); Jay
P. Greene & Julie R. Trivitt, Can Judges Improve Academic Achievement?, 83 PEABODY J.
EDUC. 224, 227 (2008) (“Refutation of the validity of [cost study] techniques has been ably
done in previous work . . . .”).
85 See Diana Pullin, Ensuring an Adequate Education: Opportunity to Learn, Law, and Social
Science, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 83, 113–14 (2007) (stating that we now more about
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analyzing cost effectiveness or the comparative cost efficiency of such strategies.86
Indeed, efforts to increase and equalize school funding are ultimately aimed at
improving what happens in classrooms, but there are several powerful influences
outside the classroom that influence student learning besides funding. Because
teachers are often powerless to manipulate these influences, effectively scaling up
educational interventions that may work in one setting has proven extremely
challenging in another.87
This challenge of scaling reform strategies has emerged with regard to the specific
strategies used in school finance litigation. For example, while some “model”
preschool programs have been found to be effective for improving students’ learning
opportunities, scaling such programs is difficult because similar levels of expertise
and resources are not widely available.88 Similarly, while class-size reduction may be
particularly efficacious for students living in poverty, it is also clear that shrinking
class size does not necessarily change students’ learning opportunities, given the
influence of any number of contextual factors, like teachers’ ability and willingness to
shift their teaching practices to take advantage of the opportunities offered by small
class size.89 Indeed, the literacy programs suggested by the plaintiffs in recent
litigation focused on establishing a federal right of access to literacy. While based on
well-established research findings, they “undersold the complexity and difficulty of
translating research evidence into interventions that can consistently improve literacy
opportunities and outcomes at the scale of a district like Detroit.” 90 So, although one
would hope that educational research would direct courts hearing school finance cases
to particular interventions that they could simply order states to implement, challenges
rooted in both horizontal and vertical governance demand a more nuanced approach
for promoting actual change for the students that need it the most.

students’ opportunities to learn, instructional leadership, and what educators need to know and
be able to do).
86 See Patrice Iatrola & Norm Fruchter, An Alternative Method for Measuring CostEffectiveness: A Case Study of New York City's Annenberg Challenge Grant, 32 J. EDUC. FIN.
276, 276 (2006) (“[N]either policymakers nor researchers habitually use analyses measuring
school reform cost-effectiveness.”).
87 See Sarah-Kathryn McDonald et al., Scaling-up Exemplary Interventions, 35 EDUC.
RESEARCHER 15, 17 (2006) (“It is the variability introduced by these contextual differences that
creates uncertainty regarding the potential of an intervention to be brought to scale.”).
88 See JANET CURRIE, BROOKINGS ROUNDTABLE ON CHILD. EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTION
PROGRAMS:
WHAT
DO
WE
KNOW?,
at
10–24
(2000),
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.492.8316&rep=rep1&type=pdf
(citing the Abcedarian Project and the Perry Preschool Program as model programs, but also
discussing problems with scaling up such programs).
89 See, e.g., DOUGLAS D. READY, CLASS-SIZE REDUCTION: POLICY, POLITICS, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUITY 23 (2008) (“[T]he efficacy of social policies often depends on the
contexts in which they are implemented.”).
90 Benjamin M. Superfine, Susan R. Goldman & Meagan S. Richard, Toward a Synergistic
Model for Improving the Use of Research in Court-Driven Educational Reform: Examining
Gary B. v. Snyder and Literacy Improvement in Detroit, 48 EDUC. RESEARCHER 543, 546 (2018).
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Education of Students with Disabilities

This Part examines efforts of large-scale reform in the context of special education.
It traces its legal origins, continued court involvement, and federal legislative efforts.
This Part also assesses the empirical research on special education as it relates to
students’ educational opportunities and performance. Assessing reform in the
education of students with disabilities is particularly salient for this Article. Courts
and legislatures have both played—and continue to play—an integral role in shaping
the nature and scope of education rights for students with disabilities, and local
administrators and educators are tasked to implement the education students receive
in the classroom.
1.

Legal Origins of Special Education Reform

While federal courts first played a defining role in guaranteeing a legal right to an
education for students with disabilities, Congress codified significant court decisions
shortly later.91 Both continue to determine important facets of special education.
Importantly, assessing efforts to ensure equal educational opportunity in the special
education context requires a deep consideration of factors situated at the local level
where highly legal and technical concepts or standards must be applied. It is here that
special education presents specific implementation and governance challenges 92 and
reflects the limits of reform initiated and maintained through courts and Congress. 93
The rights of students with disabilities in modern day public education can be
largely traced to two major class action lawsuits. In Pennsylvania Ass’n of Retarded
Children (PARC), a federal district court held that mentally disabled children with
disabilities must be educated in regular education classrooms wherever
possible.94 In Mills v. Board of Education, a federal district court expanded PARC to

91 Two important federal court decisions ushered in modern day special education law. See
Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Child. (PARC) v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1266 (E.D. Pa.
1971); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Child. (PARC) v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972). Congress codified
these cases with the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (1975) (EAHCA). See infra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
92 For example, the IDEA and its implementing regulations require the delivery of an
“appropriate” education, a term that can create considerable disagreement between
practitioners, parents, and those in the field. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17
(defining “Free Appropriate Public Education” or FAPE). See also Endrew F. v. Couglas Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 997–98 (2017) (discussing the level of benefit required for a school
district to satisfy its FAPE obligation).
93 See Judith Welch Wegner, Variations on a Theme—The Concept of Equal Educational
Opportunity and Programming Decisions Under the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, 48 L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 172–73 (1985) (describing the interpretive
difficulties for courts and Congress in defining what programmatic services are required under
special education law to provide equal educational opportunity).
94 See Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children, 334 F. Supp. at 1266; Pa. Ass’n for Retarded
Children, 343 F. Supp. 279.
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require procedural due process protections to all children with disabilities.95
Both cases reflect what courts can do well: identify and articulate in broad strokes the
educational rights of marginalized citizens,96 in this case the rights of students with
disabilities and, in the process, spur legislative action.97
Congress ultimately codified essential principles enunciated in PARC and Mills
with the passage of Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA).98 The
EAHCA has evolved over time. Congress renamed the EAHCA the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1990, and the IDEA is the operative law
governing the education of students with disabilities today.99 Congress substantively
amended the IDEA in 1997 and, most recently, in 2004.100 The IDEA and its
implementing regulations include a complicated array of procedural safeguards
intended to ensure the substantive right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE)
delivered through an individual student’s Individual Education Program (IEP). 101 The
IEP is the operative document that reflects the services, programming, and the like, to
be delivered in the education setting and by educators.

95 See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 877.
96 See, e.g., NEIL KOMESAR, THE LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF RIGHTS 3 (2001) (“Courts are most needed where alternative decisions makers such
as political processes, markets, and informal communities work least well.”).
97 See, e.g., Liebman & Sabel, supra note 69, at 192.
98 Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
99 The IDEA has been termed a “model of ‘cooperative federalism.’” Little Rock Sch.
Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F. 3d 816, 830 (8th Cir. 1999). Congress sets aspirational goals, disburses
funds intended to support states and localities in meeting those goals. It provides technical
assistance and compliance monitoring intended. States, in turn, must oversee the
implementation of the law at the local level and report compliance to the federal government.
See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 183 (1982) (“[The IDEA] leaves to the States the primary responsibility for developing
and executing educational programs for handicapped children, [but] imposes significant
requirements to be followed in the discharge of that responsibility.”).
100 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485) (codification of discipline amendments).
101 In brief, these provisions require that students with disabilities receive a FAPE to be
delivered in the least restrictive environment (the LRE). 34 C.F.R. § 300.101 (2021).
Importantly, the statute requires that the local education agency (LEA) reduce to writing the
elements of the students FAPE within an Individualized Education Program (IEP). 34 C.F.R. §
300.17 (2021). The IEP distills practitioners’ belief of what services and instruction must be
delivered to satisfy its obligations under the IDEA.
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Continued Court Oversight of Special Education

Federal courts continue to interpret important provisions of IDEA and its
application.102 Through both class and individual civil actions, federal courts
(including the Supreme Court) have addressed school districts’ delivery on the core of
IDEA’s intent to provide equal educational opportunity for students with disabilities,
such as the guarantees of a FAPE.103 The Supreme Court has decided important cases
with national importance, including those deciding the burden of proof in special
education hearings,104 and defining “related services” to include catheterization,105
and the costs of services required under a special education and related services.106
Court involvement in special education exposes both the strength and limitations
of that institution as a reform agent. Class actions have highlighted courts’ struggles
in technical matters of educational policy or to command change without the power to
tax and spend reserved to a legislative body.107 Similarly, such suits have led to
protracted court involvement that raise separation of powers issues and can invariably
result in an insufficient remedy.108 To be sure, it must be recognized that certain class
actions—including PARC and Mills—raised the awareness of the public, educational
practitioners, and governmental entities about the complete denial of educational
opportunity for an entire class of children, reinforcing an important role of courts to
secure rights of minority populations.
Indeed, many court-driven changes intended to reform special education have
arisen from individual actions reflecting the use of private rights as a tool for civil
rights enforcement and policy reform.109 The IDEA creates a private right of action
in federal courts that can achieve significant reform or change depending on how far
a particular case proceeds in the federal court system. For instance, the Supreme Court

102 The IDEA sets forth a host of administrative remedies that must be followed but
ultimately permits any party (including a school district) the right to bring a civil action in
federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(i)(2)(A).
103 The Court first beginning with Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180–81 (1982) and,
most recently, in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017).
104 See Schaeffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005).
105 See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 889–90 (1984).
106 See Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 77 (1999).
107 See id. (noting that plaintiffs seeking to pressure change through class actions should
concentrate efforts on programmatic issues and new institutional mechanisms).
108 See e.g., Erica L. Green, City Schools Special Education Legal Fight Ends, BALT. SUN
(Sept. 20, 2012, 9:51 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/education/bs-md-ci-vaughn-g-ends20120920-story.html (documenting the end of a lawsuit filed in 1984 which reached a final
settlement in 2012). See also Joshua Weishart, Rethinking Constitutionality in Education Rights
Cases, 71 ARK. L. REV. 495, 495 (2019) (describing, generally, the reluctance of courts to get
involved in constitutional questions concerning education because of the difficulty to extricate
the judicial branch).
109 See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 308 (1996).
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has adjudicated numerous disputes involving key elements of the IDEA that have had
significant implications for the delivery of special education on a national scale.
The private enforcement mechanism has its limits with respect to achieving large
scale reform.110 For example, the high transaction costs associated with private
enforcement favor the wealthy111 or those who can burden the initial costs of bringing
a complicated lawsuit through state and then federal processes.112 Litigation through
individual private rights of action pressure school districts to redirect precious
resources away from programming and toward costly legal battles (or insurance
premiums), diluting resources available to other programs for non-disabled peers.113
As a general matter, fear of a special education lawsuit contributes to an adversarial
nature between parents and district officials.114 Still some even suggest that parents
of non-disabled children feel that children with disabilities enjoy preferential
treatment to the exclusion of their children because of a right to sue. 115
3.

Recent Congressional Amendments to the IDEA

Congress amended the IDEA in substantive ways in 2004 with an eye to addressing
the issues identified as problematic by researchers and some court cases. For example,
Congress attempted to address the disproportionate disciplinary actions being taken
against students with disabilities through zero-tolerance policies,116 responding to
data suggesting such policies were harming students. 117 Similarly, Congress adopted

110 Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education Poverty and the Limits of Judicial Enforcement, 86
NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1413, 1443–50 (2011) (noting the limitations of a private right of action
in enforcing the rights under the IDEA).
111 See, e.g., Julie F. Mead & Mark A. Paige, Board of Education v. Rowley: Examining Its
Precedential Impacts, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 329, 341 (2008); LaDonna Boeckman, Bestowing the
Key to Public Education: The Effects of Judicial Determinations of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act on Disabled and Nondisabled Students, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 855, 876
(1998).
112 See Pasachoff, supra note 110, at 1419; Superfine, supra note 25, at 486.
113 See Perry Zirkel, The Two Dispute Decisional Processes under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: An Empirical Comparison, 16 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 169, 169 (2017)
(concluding that the IDEA is “the most active source of litigation within the K-12 school
context.”). It is important to note, however, that school districts typically carry some form of
liability insurance that covers portion of direct costs of litigation. Of course, the rates of such
policies may be impacted by an increased level of litigation.
114 See, e.g., Marjorie Coeyman, Are Schools More Afraid of Lawsuits than They Should Be?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 27, 2003), https://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0527/p21s01lepr.html.
115 Bruce Meredith & Julie Underwood, Irreconcilable Differences: Defining the Rising
Conflict Between Regular and Special Education, 24 J.L. & EDUC. 195, 211 (1995).
116 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A). See also Mark Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals
with Disabilities Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 8 (2006) (summarizing amendments to the Individuals
with Disabilities Act).
117 See Weber, supra note 116, at 8.
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Response to Intervention, an innovative and progressive model to identify students
with disabilities that was widely recognized in the field of education to efficiently
reach students in need.118
Yet, at the same time, the 2004 amendments reflected Congress’s susceptibility to
political pressure and embracing politically popular—but untested—ideas. In
particular, the reauthorization of the IDEA in 2004 was aligned with the accountability
goals and provisions of the recently passed No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act.119
Tightening the connection between accountability-based reform and special education
law presented unintended negative consequences.120 Despite Congress’s best
intentions, the issues related to eligibility and discipline for students with disabilities
continue to frustrate both parents of students with disabilities and local level
educators’ efforts to fulfill the promise of the IDEA.
4.

Empirical Research on Special Education

Educational scholars have long studied the impact of special education on students
with disabilities. As researchers have noted, Congress’s enactment of special
education law exponentially increased access to education for students with
disabilities, as one would hope.121 Similarly, it has reduced the intentional exclusion
of students with disabilities from public education.122 Researchers have noted that

118 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(A). Specifically, the Response to Intervention model permits
school districts the ability to reach struggling students more efficiently and its short- and longterm effects have been measured by educational researchers. See e.g., Sally L. Grapin et al.,
Longitudinal Effects of RtI Implementation on Reading Achievement Outcomes, 56 PSCYH.
SCHS. 2, 242–54 (2020) (describing the use of Response to Intervention in schools and its
demonstrated benefits in the context of both regular and special education as well as reporting
on long-term academic gains attributable to the use of Response to Intervention).
119 See Weber, supra note 116, at 15.
120 See Joshua Bleiberg & Darrell West, Special Education: The Forgotten Issue in No Child
Left Behind Reform, BROOKINGS (June 18, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2013/06/18/special-education-the-forgotten-issue-in-no-child-left-behind-reform/
(describing the complications associated with requirement that students with disabilities take
standardized tests under NCLB and offering various amendments for Congress to consider).
121 See, e.g., David Egnor, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1996:
Overview of the U.S. Senate Bill (S.I578), 11 FOCUS ON AUTISM & OTHER DEV. DISABILITIES,
194, 194 (1996) (noting that prior to 1975, “[m]ost children with disabilities who went to school
were segregated from their peers, and most young people with severe disabilities were destined
to spend their lives in an institution”); Antonis Katsiyannis et al., Reflections on the 25th
Anniversary of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 22 REMEDIAL AND SPECIAL
EDUC. 324, 324–25 (2001). For a more recent overview of the progress and limitations of special
education law, see Marian Patricia Bea Francisco et al., Inclusion and Special Education, EDUC.
SCI., at 7–8 (Sept. 7, 2020), https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7102/10/9/238/htm (describing the
relative achievements in the education of children with disabilities because of special education
law, but also highlighting the continued problems associated with ensuring inclusion and
provision of least restrictive environment).
122 See William Clune & Mark H. Van Pelt, A Political Method of Evaluating the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and Several Gaps of Analysis, 48 L. AND CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7, 18 (1985) (noting “the sharp rise in the number of children who are receiving an
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mandated inclusion of students with disabilities has helped lead to innovative methods
of identification and assessment that have benefitted both disabled and non-disabled
students.123
Educators have adjusted curriculum to ensure students with disabilities access the
general curriculum which, in turn, has led to innovations benefiting the regular
education population too.124 Likewise, resources and efforts have been targeted, in
great part because of legal requirements, to identifying students early so as to provide
interventions even before students reach compulsory education age and enter public
schools. Thus, education researchers and professionals have contributed to the access
and quality of education for students with disabilities since those rights were identified
by the courts and codified under the IDEA.
However, scholars continue to identify opportunity and achievement gaps with
respect to special education students, a signal that inequities persist in special
education despite the significant court and legislative achievements.125 Academic
outcomes of students with disabilities, while improving, have not met certain
standards set forth by other sometimes conflicting education law and policy goals
driven by political agendas.126 At the same time, the nature of certain disabilities can
be quite complicated, making it difficult to devise and implement certain programs,127
especially in context of schools with limited resources. 128

appropriate, or at least more appropriate, education” since the passage of the first special
education law).
123 See John J. Hoover & Emily Love, Supporting School-Based Response to Intervention:
A Practitioner’s Model, 43 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 40, 47 (2011).
124 See, e.g., Suk-Hyang Lee et al., Impact of Curriculum Modifications on Access to the
General Education Curriculum for Students with Disabilities, 76 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 213, 213
(2010).
125 See, e.g., Mark Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 145 (2009)
(highlighting racial inequities concerning identification of students of color as students with
disabilities).
126 See Mark Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 58
FLA. L. REV. 7, 15 (2006) (noting that the 2004 Reauthorization of the IDEA attempts to align
with the accountability goals of No Child Left Behind).
127 For example, the law provides some catch-all definition for disabilities, including
“[s]pecific learning disability” and “[o]ther health impair[ed].” 34 §§ C.F.R. 300.8(c)(9)–(10)
(2017). However, these terms are difficult to apply in context. See, e.g., Attention
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): Symptoms and Diagnosis, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/adhd/diagnosis.html (last visited
Apr.13, 2021) (noting the difficulty in diagnosing ADHD). Researchers have noted that
determining a specific reading disability among English learners can be difficult. See Dara
Shifrer et al., Disproportionality and Learning Disabilities: Parsing Apart Race, SocioEconomic Status, and Language, 44 J. LEARNING DISABILITIES 246, 246 (2011).
128 See, e.g., The Burden of Underfunded Mandates, N.J. SCH. BDS. ASS’N (2016),
https://www.njsba.org/news-publications/school-leader/july-august-2016-volume-471/burden-underfunded-mandates/ (describing a host of unfunded mandates including special
education); see also RICHARD N. APPLING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30810, INDIVIDUALS WITH

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss3/7

24

2022]

FROM GOVERNANCE TO THE CLASSROOM

585

Inequality based on race, disability, and language stubbornly persists within the
special education context. For instance, the appropriate special education
identification of students of color varies and depends on factors unique to a particular
local context.129 This, in turn, perpetuates a host of other negative consequences, such
as disciplinary practices that reflect racial bias.130 Likewise, and despite procedural
due process protections grounded in the law, students with disabilities continue to be
disciplined disproportionally when compared to non-disabled peers,131 although gains
have been made. Nevertheless, biased discipline and exclusionary practices remain a
concern of researchers and civil rights advocates in the special education context,132
as well as a persistent issue for the general education student population.
At the same time, federal policymakers have enacted other laws that frustrate the
implementation of the IDEA and send mixed messages to special education
professionals.133 Researchers have cited the passage of No Child Left Behind (NCLB)
on this point.134 NCLB’s focus on proficiency outcomes on standardized tests
scores135 presented conflicts to practitioners of special education who, under the
IDEA, were directed to tailor educational goals and services based on the individual
needs of the students.136 Further, the promotion of charter schools through federal law

DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): ISSUES REGARDING “FULL FUNDING” OF PART B GRANTS
TO STATES (2001) (documenting the history of federal underfunding of special education).
129 See, e.g., Paul Morgan et al., Minorities are Disproportionately Underrepresented in
Special Education: Longitudinal Evidence Across Five Disability Conditions, 44 EDUC.
RESEARCHER 278, 278 (2015); Jacob Hibel et al., Who is Placed in Special Education?, 83 SOC.
EDUC. 312, 312 (2010); Paul L. Morgan et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in ADHD
Diagnosis from Kindergarten to Eighth Grade, 132 PEDIATRICS 85, 86 (2013) (finding that black
children are only two-thirds as likely as white children to be diagnosed with attentiondeficit/hyperactivity disorder).
130 See Russell J. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender
Disproportionality in School Punishment, 34 URB. REV. 317, 317 (2002). See also Dan Losen
& Kevin Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive Legal
Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Service for Minority Children,
36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 447–48 (2001).
131 U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION DATA
SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1 (2014). But cf. Paul Morgan et al., Are U.S. Schools
Discriminating When Suspending Students with Disabilities? A Best-Evidence Synthesis, 86
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 7, 7 (2019).
132 See, e.g., Dear Colleague Letter: Preventing Racial Discrimination in Special Education,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
EDUC.
(Dec.
12,
2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201612-racedisc-special
education.pdf.
133 See Weber, supra note 116, at 8.
134 See, e.g., id.
135 See id. at 15 n.47.
136 See Jennifer Russell & Laura Bray, Crafting Coherence from Complex Policy Messages:
Educators’ Perceptions of Special Education and Standards-Based Accountability Policies, 21

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

25

586

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[70:561

incentivized such schools to exclude students with disabilities to avoid any negative
impact on a school’s performance on accountability metrics.137 Put another way, the
policy incoherence has, in some cases, perpetuated the very inequities the IDEA was
intended to remediate.
In addition, local school districts have struggled to satisfy the demands of the
IDEA because of insufficient funding from the federal and state government, further
reflecting the problems that arise when entities situated horizontally attempt to
structure change that demands significant funding from other layers of vertical
governance structure.138 When Congress passed the IDEA and its predecessor statute,
it assured states that federal funding would cover a full 40% of each state’s “excess
costs” of education for students with disabilities.139 While the federal government has
increased spending in recent years, it has never satisfied its initial promise to the
states.140 Such underfunding, which has been labeled an unfunded mandate by
some,141 has yielded unintended consequences that diminish the quality of special
education services for both those students with and without disabilities. 142
Finally, studies have consistently identified problems with respect to
implementation of special education at the classroom level, thus raising issues when
examining special education from a vertical governance perspective. These

EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, no. 12, 2013, at 17 (documenting the confusion among
teachers created by conflicting theories of action between NCLB and IDEA).
137 See, e.g., Natalie Lacireno-Paquet et al., Creaming Versus Cropping: Charter School
Enrollment Practices in Response to Market Incentives, 24 EDUC. EVALUATION AND POL’Y
ANALYSIS 145, 145 (2002) (finding that charter schools tend to “crop off” students who might
be higher needs and more costly, including students with disabilities). See also John Tedesco &
Shelby Webb, Charter Schools Lag Behind in Special Education, HOUST. CHRON. (Nov. 18,
2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Texas-Charterschools-denied-special-education-14837752.php (describing how charter schools in Texas have
lower rates of students with disabilities than traditional public schools).
138 See Rebecca W. Goldman, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least Restrictive
Environment: Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 243 (1994).
139 See APPLING, supra note 128, at 3.
140 See id.
141 See, e.g., Evie Blad, Why the Feds Still Fall Short on Special Education Funding, EDUC.
WK. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2020/01/15/why-the-feds-still-fallshort-on.html.
142 Wade F. Horn & Douglas Tynan, Time to Make Education “Special” Again, in
RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 23, 26 (Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al. eds.,
2001) (discussing the “extraordinary growth” of special education “often at the expense of
regular education”); Gregory F. Corbett, Special Education, Equal Protection and Education
Finance: Does the Individuals with Disabilities Act Violate a General Education Student's
Fundamental Right to Education?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 633, 634 (1999) (noting that studies
demonstrate that “the share of all spending received by general education declined from
approximately eighty percent in 1967 to fifty-six percent in 1996” while the “expenditures
devoted to special education more than quadrupled from four percent to seventeen percent”).
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implementation issues have been evident since the very beginning of special education
law. In a classic study of policy implementation, researchers applied a “street-level
bureaucracy” analysis to assess how special education teachers managed a state law
intended to reform special education.143 These researchers identified problems that
continue to persist today, including lack of training and planning support from state
agencies, inadequate training for classroom teachers, and a lack of resources that
prevented full implementation of the statute’s requirements.144 Other scholars have
similarly noted the difficulties practitioners face in satisfying the goals of special
education in the “real world” context of a school or classroom. 145 Still others have
called attention to some of the chasms that have developed between parents of students
with disabilities and those of non-disabled students based on a perception of
preferential treatment and rights for some students with disabilities. 146 Indeed,
satisfying the demands of the IDEA can be difficult, depending on the resources and
capacity of school districts,147 and pose unique challenges to state and local
practitioners.
C.

Standards-based Reform and Accountability

Perhaps no other area of education reform illustrates the essential issues of
horizontal and vertical governance, and their relationship with student learning
opportunities and performance, more than efforts to remake schools through
standards-based reform and accountability.148 The massive shift to a strict reform and
accountability model without attention to factors at the local level has created
significant unintended consequences and, more importantly, failed to achieve the
goals of reducing inequities. By way of brief background, the Russian launching of
Sputnik in 1957 sharpened both policymakers’ (particularly those in Washington) and
the public’s concern with the quality of science and math instruction in public

143 See Richard Weatherley & Martin Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucrats and Institutional
Innovation: Implementing Special Education Reform, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 171, 171–72
(1977); see also Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 122, at 8 (describing “human interactions” and
outlining a “political method” to evaluate how special education practitioners implement the
law and concluding that there can be wide variations).
144 See Weatherley & Lipsky, supra note 143, at 195.
145 See, e.g., James H. Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect of Scarce
Resources on the Implementation of Pub. L. No. 94-142, 14 CONN. L. REV. 477, 478 (1982)
(lamenting that the goals of federal special education law could not be achieved within the terms
by which public education is funded which created conditions of resource scarcity).
146 See Meredith & Underwood, supra note 115, at 196.
147 See id.
148 We use the terms standards-based reform to suggest that there is some level of knowledge
or skills that should be attained through public education and that attainment can be measured.
To be sure, standardization of instruction of schools to address perceived social issues, such as
massive immigration, is nothing new as a historical matter. In the earliest stages of the Republic,
state governments attempted to reform and standardize education at the local level. See CARL
KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC 134 (1983).
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education.149 In the 1980s, a national commission published a scathing rebuke of the
quality of the country’s public schools in the report A Nation at Risk.150 The report
concluded that, among other things, some degree of standardization of education and
some assessment of “outcomes” was needed so that the country could compete,
maintain, and secure its economic and national security.151 A Nation at Risk also
ushered in a new focus on education policy that placed standards, assessment, and
accountability at its core.152 This emphasis on standards, assessment, and
accountability ultimately manifested in the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,
the Race to the Top Fund, and the Every Student Succeeds Act in the 2000s.
1.

Federal Education Policy in the 2000s

Federal emphasis on standards-based accountability reached its apex during
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations with the passage of
NCLB in 2002 and the Race to the Top Program (RttT) in 2009, respectively. NCLB,
President Bush’s signature legislative achievements, reauthorized the Elementary
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and represented a historic shift in the federal role
in education.153 NCLB codified educational policy goals of standards and
accountability and linked federal funding to the achievement of specific metrics. In
particular, the law required states to adopt certain standards in core academic subjects
of math and reading and ensure that all students achieve proficiency by 2014.154 It
further required that schools annually demonstrate that students and schools were
achieving certain academic progress by meeting Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)
goals—essentially incremental progress that would culminate in full student

149 See Larry Abramson, Sputnik Left Legacy for U.S. Science Curriculum, NPR (Sept. 30,
2007), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14829195.
150 See DIANE RAVITCH, DEATH
(2010).

AND

LIFE

OF THE

GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM 22

151 The report, although without any force of law itself, is frequently cited as playing a crucial
role in a policy and law emphasis on standards and accountability. See id. at 22–30.
152 At the urging of various national commissions and some federal laws, states began to
implement standards-based reform, including the use of curriculum standards, but shied away
from any national standards for curriculum. See, e.g., id. at 19 (discussing the Clinton
administration’s program “Goals 2000 Program,” a federal initiative incentivizing states to
develop their own standards).
153 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq.). President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Elementary
Secondary Education Act of 1965 which provided significant federal funding to state and local
school districts as part of his larger “War on Poverty.” Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
154 For an excellent overview of this provision of NCLB, see Alyson Klein, No Child Left
Behind: An Overview, EDUC. WK. (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/nochild-left-behind-an-overview/2015/04.
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proficiency by 2014.155 Student results were to be reported publicly according to
various “subgroups” such as race, special education, or income level.156
Schools that failed to satisfy AYP faced numerous penalties, and the punitive
nature of the law represented a distinguishing feature of NCLB. Sanctions included
providing parents with options to choose other schools, 157 requiring the use of
supplemental services (e.g., tutoring provided by private entities),158 instituting
curricular changes, and replacing personnel, and school closure. The theory of action
of NCLB—that accountability as measured through student test achievement would
reform public education on a large scale—has been widely criticized159 even by some
of those who originally supported the high-stakes accountability model.160
Less than a decade later, President Obama’s RttT program extended the federal
emphasis on standards and accountability embodied in NCLB. Indeed, RttT took
NCLB’s accountability provisions and extended them directly to individual teacher
job security. To receive RttT funds, states were required to commit to linking teacher
employment and personnel decisions to student growth on assessments, a
controversial and unproven idea.161 Many states significantly altered teacher
evaluation components of state statutes and collective bargaining agreements (where
applicable) to satisfy conditions for receipt of RttT funds.162 Similarly, the U.S.

155 See id.
156 See id.
157 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E).
158 Id. § 6316(b)(5)(B).
159 See Richard Rothstein, Leaving “No Child Left Behind”, THE AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 15,
2007), https://prospect.org/features/leaving-no-child-left-behind-behind (writing that the law
“ignored well-established statistical and management theories predicting perverse
consequences for test-based accountability.”); see also David Hursh, Exacerbating Inequality:
The Failed Promise of No Child Left Behind, 10 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 295, 295 (2007)
(noting that NCLB’s focus on accountability turned attention away addressing the impact of
poverty on educational achievement); Richard Rothstein, NCLB Bill: The Problem with
Continuous
Improvement,
THE
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
12,
2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/nclb-bill-the-problem-withcontinuous-improvement/2011/10/11/gIQA7nztdL_blog.html (criticizing proposals to continue
large scale, one-size-fits-all policy reforms from the federal level following the experiences with
NCLB).
160 Steve Inskeep, Former ‘No Child Left Behind’ Advocate Turns Critic, NPR (Mar. 2,
2010), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124209100.
161 See Mark A. Paige, Moving Forward While Looking Back: How Can VAM Lawsuits
Guide Evaluation Policy in the Age of ESSA?, 28 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, no. 64,
2020, at 3, https://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/5067/2429 (discussing the Race to the Top
requirement to use test scores for teacher evaluation as part of a larger commentary about ways
to move beyond such evaluation mechanisms).
162 See Patrick McGuinn, Stimulating Reform: Race to the Top Competitive Grants, 26 EDUC.
POL’Y 136, 146 (2002) (noting Race to the Top prompted an “unprecedented wave” of reforms
for teacher tenure and evaluation policy).
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Department of Education married RttT to national standards such as the Common
Core.163 As such, RttT reflected the continuation of federal government’s attempt to
create large-scale change in educational policy through standards and
accountability,164 but without detailed attention to how those policies would manifest
at the local and classroom level.
In 2015, finally recognizing the failures of NCLB, Congress replaced important
provisions of the statute with the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), the most recent
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA).165 To many,
ESSA represented a correction to what some viewed as too much involvement in state
and local education through NCLB because ESSA returned many decisions to states
that were previously determined by federal law under NCLB. 166 Still, important
provisions of ESSA include the continuing NCLB requirement for content and
achievement standards in certain subject areas,167 alignment of state standards, and
coursework to higher education or career standards.168 ESSA also continues to require
some degree of remedial action for schools identified as underperforming.169
To be sure, ESSA also replaced the AYP metric used under NCLB. Nevertheless,
states are now required to design their own accountability regimen that includes goals
for all students and student subgroups used under NCLB.170 States must use results
generated under these accountability systems to identify schools in need of some form
of intervention or reform.171 While NCLB was highly prescriptive as to the
interventions used to underperforming schools, ESSA allows for some flexibility in
this regard.172

163 See, e.g., Joe Onosko, Race to the Top Leaves Children and Future Citizens Behind, 19
DEMOCRACY
&
EDUC.,
issue
2,
no.
1,
2011,
at
1–3,
https://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol19/iss2/1 (noting the close linkages between
RttT and Common Core and concluding that such highly centralized and standardized
approaches hurt schools and democracy).
164 See id.
165 Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1807 (2015).
166 See Michael Heise, From No Child Left Behind to Every Student Succeeds: Back to a
Future for Education Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1859, 1874 (2017) (concluding that
ESSA “reverses the previous educational federalism boundaries established by NCLB.”).
167 See id. at 1872.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 1874.
170 See The Every Student Succeeds Act: Explained, EDUC. WK. (Dec. 8, 2015),
https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/the-every-student-succeeds-act-explained/2015/12.
171 The statute requires a state to identify at least 5% of its Title I schools for comprehensive
intervention. Id.
172 See id. For instance, states have some flexibility in developing the criteria used to identify
schools and tailoring corrective actions.
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Empirical Research on No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top

NCLB faced immediate obstacles and resistance at the state and local levels
charged with implementing its commands. The highly prescriptive standardized
testing, accountability systems, and associated costs with the law (e.g., supplemental
services through outside providers, testing preparation materials) placed considerable
strain on state and local education budgets.173 Some states and teacher associations
challenged the constitutionality of the law in federal court, arguing that NCLB
constituted a prohibited “unfunded mandate” and violation of the Spending Clause
under the Constitution.174 While these plaintiffs were unsuccessful, their decision to
litigate the matter reflects the intensity of their opposition to the law’s implementation.
Yet, NCLB significantly impacted instruction at the classroom level in ways that
did not resolve—and perhaps worsened—inequity. NCLB’s exclusionary focus on
certain core subjects (math and reading) diluted the breadth and depth of other course
offerings for schools.175 Its punitive, zero-sum game theory of action pitted teachers
and districts against one other. Research and popular press reported that teachers and
administrators sought to “game the system” by negotiating to teach in high-performing
schools and, in the most egregious instances, engaging in criminal behavior by altering
student test answers.176
Results regarding the attainment of NCLB’s ultimate goal—student test score
improvement in certain subject areas—are inconclusive, at best. Despite its highly
prescriptive nature, NCLB permitted states to set their own standards and
corresponding tests to demonstrate proficiency. Accordingly, many simply set the bar
quite low, allowing for the appearance of success.177 Yet claims of incredible student
growth on state tests were not generally borne out when student proficiency was
measured by the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP), an assessment
used across all states.178 Worse yet, to the extent modest gains were demonstrated
during the implementation of NCLB, researchers have doubted that any gains in

173 See William Mathis, No Child Left Behind: Costs and Benefits, 84 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
679, 679–82 (May 2003) (concluding that the costs to implement NCLB exceeded the funds
provided by the federal government).
174 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2009)
(upholding dismissal of challenge to NCLB on Spending Clause grounds).
175 See Richard Rothstein & Rebecca Jacobsen, The Goals of Education, 88 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 264, 265 (Dec. 2006) (discussing the effects of NCLB on various subjects).
176 See Richard Faussett & Alan Blinder, Atlanta School Workers Sentenced in Test Cheating
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/us/atlanta-schoolworkers-sentenced-in-test-score-cheating-case.html (discussing examples of cheating on
standardized assessments).
177 See SUPERFINE, supra note 3, at 194 (discussing the ability of states to set low standards
of accountability).
178 See Jackyung Lee & Todd Reeves, Revisiting the Impact of NCLB High-Stakes School
Accountability, Capacity, and Resources: State NAEP 1990–2009 Reading and Math
Achievement Gaps and Trends, 34 EDUC. EVAL. POL’Y ANALYSIS 209, 209 (2012).
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student achievement should be attributed to the federal law and not to other factors.179
Moreover, the achievement gap between black and white children on standardized
tests, according to some, actually expanded following the implementation of
NCLB.180
Evidence suggesting any lasting or even positive reform on student achievement
and opportunity through the RttT is similarly thin.181 To be fair, some credit RttT as
a success because it was successful in shifting state priorities to a more aggressive
emphasis on standards and accountability.182 Yet, at the same time, scholars noted at
the time it was adopted, the reforms encouraged by RttT lacked empirical support in
terms of the aspirational goals and chosen means to reach those goals,183 which
perhaps should have cautioned federal policymakers to take a less aggressive
approach. In addition, it failed to account for the significant costs and logistical
coordination needed to translate common standards into materials and practices that
could be used in the classroom.184
As a result, many of the efforts flowing from RttT to improve both the quality of
teachers and schools were largely unsuccessful and only led to frustration at the local
and classroom level.185 RttT’s emphasis on linking teacher employment status to
student performance on test scores with the use of the highly controversial ValueAdded Models (“VAMs”) has largely been discredited as a means to improve teacher
quality.186 VAMs in education employment decisions are riddled with significant

179 See id. at 211.
180 See id. at 224.
181 See Elaine Weiss, Mismatches in Race to the Top Limit Educational Improvement, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.epi.org/publication/race-to-the-top-goals/.
182 See William G. Howell, Results of President Obama’s Race to the Top Program, EDUC.
NEXT,
Fall
2015,
at
58,
58,
https://www.educationnext.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/03/ednext_XV_4_howell.pdf (asserting that the Race to the Top was
successful because of a “marked surge” of adoption of new education policies following the
introduction of Race to the Top, but not commenting on the efficacy of these policies). See also
Patrick McGuinn, Stimulating Reform: Race to the Top, Competitive Grants and the Obama
Education Agenda, 26 EDUC. POL’Y 1, 136, 136–59 (2012) (recognizing that states adopted a
number of education strategies because of Race to the Top but arguing that any long-term impact
would be blunted by obstacles at the state and local level).
183 See Weiss, supra note 181 (highlighting the various shortcomings of Race to the Top and
noting that where educational opportunity expanded required a comprehensive approach that
encompassed other areas of social policy, not just educational).
184 See id.
185 See id. (noting that Race to the Top frustrated relationships between unions and
management, making teachers suspicious of the underlying objectives of the reform).
186 See, e.g., Mark A. Paige & Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, Houston, We Have a Lawsuit: A
Cautionary Tale for the Implementation of Value-Added Models for High-Stakes Employment
Decisions, 49 EDUC. RESEARCHER 350, 350 (2020) (generally noting the research that questions
that validity of VAMs as a means to accurately assess teacher contributions to student
outcomes).
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shortcomings because of their demonstrated lack of reliability.187 RttT forced use of
VAMs in employment relationships immediately upset labor-management
relationships as well, creating animosity between local unions and school boards.188
The drastic “turnaround” strategies embraced by RttT have also been criticized by
scholars. The ideas promoted by then U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan (e.g.,
removing principals and teachers and shuttering “failing” schools) were to provide
sweeping change to the personnel and leadership composition of entire schools and
districts.189 Yet such “reforms” ignored labor-market dynamics that are commonly
understood and accepted in the private sector, such as whether a supply of better
teachers or principals even existed to replace those moved or terminated. 190 The
adoption of other extreme reforms—such as complete state takeover of a local school
district—similarly did not align with education research that cast doubt about the
capacity or success of such strategies.191
In addition, RttT opened the door to “choice” options, such as charter schools.192
While the calls for increased choice and the efficiency of the market are sometimes
politically popular, the empirical research on successful reform through charters is
muddy, at best. Indeed, as discussed below, the extent to which charter schools can
improve educational performance equity is in doubt—in some cases, their use could
promote resegregation of schools.193 Worse yet, they have been prone to closures,
costing taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars,194 and a loss of local control. When

187 See, e.g., id. at 352–53.
188 Numerous teachers unions sought relief in federal court, arguing that the use of VAMs
were unconstitutional. While generally unsuccessful at the federal court level, courts expressed
skepticism of the use of VAMs as a matter of policy. See Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207,
1216 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (commenting that although the use of VAMs may be “unwise” as a matter
of policy, they were not unconstitutional).
189 See Lesli A. Maxwell & Michelle McNeil, Rules Ease Overhaul Strategies, EDUC. WK.,
Dec. 2, 2009, at 1 (noting that U.S. Secretary of Education Duncan targeted schools for large
school personnel reorganization or shutdown).
190 See Sam Dillon, U.S. Plan to Replace Principals: Who Will Replace Them?, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 7, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/08/education/08education.html; see also
Position Statement: Principal Shortage, NAT’L ASS’N OF SECONDARY SCH. PRINCIPALS,
https://www.nassp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Principal_Shortage.pdf (Mar. 27, 2017)
(highlighting the lack of supply to meet the demand for principals).
191 See DOMINGO MOREL, TAKEOVER: RACE, EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 47 (2018)
(assessing some state takeover models and concluding that state takeover can have a
disempowering effect on marginalized communities).
192 See infra notes 194–205 and accompanying text.
193 See ERICA FRANKENBERG & GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY, CIV. RTS. PROJECT, EQUITY
OVERLOOKED: CHARTER SCHOOLS AND CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 3 (2019) (discussing the need for
safeguards against the segregating effects of charters schools).
194 See Valerie Strauss, U.S. Government Wasted Up to a $1 Billion on Charter Schools and
Still Fails to Adequately Monitor Grants, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2019),
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considered with RttT’s focus on linking VAMs and teacher employment decisions,
RttT demonstrated the negative consequences of the federal government’s continued
embrace of a command-and-control model of action that ignored state and local
governance factors. If anything, RttT seemed to “double-down” on the NCLB model
that assumed directives from federal and state legislatures regarding standards, and
accountability would flow vertically through the educational system writ large and
translate into classrooms without friction.
D.

Charter Schools

Charter schools have spread quickly and widely around the United States. State
laws generally authorize the creation of charter schools, and the statutory schemes
governing them can differ across states.195 Between the passage of the first charter
school law in 1992 and 2017, 44 states and Washington, D.C. permitted charter
schools,196 and the number of students attending charter schools reached almost 3.2
million.197 As such, charter schools have become one of the primary approaches to
educational improvement for underserved students and educational systems more
broadly.
Charter schools arguably represent the logic of local governance more than any
other major reform currently being implemented. At their most basic level, state laws
authorize the creation of charter schools by giving governing bodies the power to grant
charters to independent, private school operators. 198 Parents and students then act as
consumers by choosing which schools to attend, which theoretically increases
competition between schools and thereby promotes educational innovation. Charter
schools are also generally subject to less regulation than traditional public schools
under the notion that they trade heightened accountability for less regulation because
their charters must be renewed, but they still continue to receive public funding.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/03/25/report-us-government-wasted-upbillion-charter-schools-still-fails-adequately-monitor-grants/.
195 See Natalie Lacireno-Paquet, Charter School Enrollments in Context: An Exploration of
Organization and Policy Influences, 81 PEABODY J. EDUC. 79, 82 (2006) (discussing the strong
influence of state laws on the characteristics of charter schools).
196 See Alyssa Rafa et. al, 50-State Comparison: Charter School Policies, EDUC. COMM. OF
28, 2020), https://www.ecs.org/charter-school-policies/.

THE STATES (Jan.

197 See REBECCA DAVID & KEVIN HESLA, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS.,
ESTIMATED PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL ENROLLMENT, 2017-2018, at 1 (2018),
https://www.publiccharters.org/sites/default/files/documents/201803/FINAL%20Estimated%20Public%20Charter%20School%20Enrollment%2C%20201718.pdf; Choice and Charter School Facts, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM,
https://edreform.com/issues/choice-charter-schools/facts/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2022).
198 As argued by education researchers Douglas N. Harris, John F. Witte, and Jon Valant,
there are “key elements” retained by charter schools that together continue to distinguish them
from their traditional public counterparts: “(a) public funding; (b) agreements or contracts that
specify the organization, management, and goals of the school; and (c) less regulation than
traditional public schools.” See Douglas N. Harris et al., The Market for Schooling, in SHAPING
EDUCATION POLICY—POWER AND PROCESS 95 (Douglas E. Mitchell et al. eds., 2011)
(discussing the evolution of market-based reforms in U.S. education reform).
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Because they have characteristics of public and private organizations, they have been
labeled as “quasi-public” or “hybrid public schools.”199 As such, charter schools are
generally grounded in the neoliberal logic that the “marketplace can provide more
efficient solutions than the public sector to pressing social problems.”200
While charter schools have proven politically contentious, they have received
support from both conservative and liberal sectors focused on the perceived benefits
of decentralizing governance power. RttT was enacted during President Obama’s time
in office as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,201 and RttT
used the lure of federal funding to loosen state-level restrictions on charter schools.202
In 2016, President Barack Obama continued to frame charter schools as playing “an
important role in our country’s education system.”203 A decade later, President
Donald Trump included an allocation of $1.1 billion for school choice in the budget
for FY 2019, with a stated goal of $20 billion annually for the same purpose.204
Indeed, charter schools have amassed supporters from a range of conservative sources
that include proponents of free market approaches and those who favored school
voucher policies and viewed charter schools as a second-best option.205
Proponents have specifically argued that moving authority away from
unresponsive, centralized bureaucracies to schools and neighborhoods should increase
teacher autonomy and efficiency.206 Some liberal advocacy organizations have also
argued that charter schools benefit underserved minority groups by moving power

199 See Catherine LoTempio, It’s Time to Try Something New: Why Old Precedent Does Not
Suit Charter Schools in the Search for State Actor Status, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 435, 437,
440 (2012) (discussing charter schools in relation to the public/private distinction).
200 See Katherine E. Bulkley & Patricia Burch, The Changing Nature of Private Engagement
in Public Education: For-Profit and Nonprofit Organizations and Educational Reform, 86
PEABODY J. EDUC. 236, 236 (2011).
201 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009).
202 See Leslie A. Maxwell, Obama Team’s Advocacy Boosts Charter Momentum, EDUC. WK.
(June 16, 2009), https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/obama-teams-advocacy-boostscharter-momentum/2009/06 (summarizing warnings made by Secretary Duncan to the states
regarding charter school policies).
203 See Proclamation No. 9437, 81 Fed. Reg. 26, 985 (Apr. 29, 2016).
204 See OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2019, at 40 (2019).
205 See JEFFREY R. HENIG, SPIN CYCLE: HOW RESEARCH IS USED IN POLICY DEBATES 42
(2008) (discussing how charter schools became a “surrogate battlefield” for vouchers).
206 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Henig, School Choice Outcomes, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 68, 71 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer
eds., 1999) (diagramming the theory of action underlying charter school policies). Notably,
many conservatives also supported charter schools as a second-best option when it became clear
that school voucher policies would not be enacted at the federal level. See HENIG, supra note
205, at 42 (2008) (discussing how charter schools became a “surrogate battlefield” for
vouchers).
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away from unresponsive governmental entities and to schools that are more responsive
to community needs.207 However, critics of charter schools have often highlighted
perceived issues that flow from charter schools such as the collapse between the public
and private spheres in education,208 weakening of teachers unions,209 and segregation
that results from parental choice.210
Despite political statements that make sweeping generalizations about charter
schools, it is worth noting that charter schools can vary greatly, particularly given their
comparative autonomy and differences in state law. Researchers have highlighted at
least five different organizational forms of charter schools: (1) stand-alone charters,
(2) for-profit education management organization charters, (3) virtual charters, (4)
clusters of loosely affiliated charters, and (5) charter management organization
charters.211 As such, charter schools or networks may reflect managerial, curricular,
linguistic, cultural, and operational variations. Indeed, given the logic of charter
schools, they reflect the educational reform strategy most aligned with a theory of
vertical governance that locates decision-making power at the extreme local level.
However, an examination of the empirical research tells a more ambiguous story than
the proponents and critics seem to suggest.
1.

Empirical Research on Charter Schools

Given what can be highly charged rhetoric from charter school proponents and
critics, the research on charter schools tends to be highly politicized and mixed.212 As
some education researchers recently argued, “[s]ome of America’s highest achieving
schools are charters, but so are some of its worst.” 213 Researchers have specifically
found mixed results for charter school performance and that charter students on

207 See HENIG, supra note 205, at 52.
208 See Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring Features of Charter School Statutes That
Blur the Public/Private Distinction, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349, 350 (2003) (discussing the fuzzy
boundaries between public and private schools as reflected in the case of charter schools).
209 See Peter Kauffman, Unionized Charter School Contracts as a Model for Reform of
Public School Job Security, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1379, 1385 (discussing how charter schools
weaken teachers unions).
210 See HENIG, supra note 205, at 95–101 (analyzing empirical studies on the relationship
between charter schools and school segregation).
211 See Rand Quinn et al., Getting to Scale: Ideas, Opportunities, and Resources in the Early
Diffusion of the Charter Management Organization, 1999-2006, TCHRS. COLL. REC. (2016),
https://www.tcrecord.org/Content.asp?ContentId=21524.
212 See Sandra Vergari, The Politics of Charter Schools, 21 EDUC. POL’Y 15, 30 (2007)
(“[T]here is a lack of relatively neutral researchers willing to confront research findings that
may conflict with their own biases and willing to consider the complexity of the charter school
phenomenon in an open-minded manner.”).
213 Chester E. Finn et al., The District and Charter Sectors of American K-12 Education:
Pros and Cons, 11 J. SCH. CHOICE 9, 9 (2017) (concluding that charter schools are producing
results equal to those of traditional public schools).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss3/7

36

2022]

FROM GOVERNANCE TO THE CLASSROOM

597

average perform about the same as their public school peers. 214 At the same time,
some studies have found that charter school students perform better on certain
standardized tests.215
Disagreements have emerged over issues of educational equity. Experimental
studies of specific models like “No Excuses” charter school attendance programs
targeted at low-income students found a positive impact on literacy and math
scores.216 For example, the high profile Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP), a
nationwide charter school operator, positively impacted student achievement in one
study.217 At the same time, some researchers have highlighted how this model can
enforce behavioral standards misaligned with the cultures of low-income students
attending those schools.218 More broadly, while one study argued that the charter
model has the potential to benefit underserved students in urban areas,219 another
argued that charter schools have an unacceptably high school closure rate and
destabilize the traditional public school system for underserved communities. 220
Moreover, although some have criticized charter schools for increasing segregation in

214 See CTR. FOR RSCH. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, STAN. UNIV., CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE
IN TEXAS 3 (2017), https://credo.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/texas_2017.pdf
(report for Texas, showing stronger annual growth in reading for charter students, but similar
results in math); CTR. FOR RSCH. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, STAN. UNIV., CHARTER SCHOOL
PERFORMANCE IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 2019, at 2 (2018), https://credo.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/2019_report_wa.pdf (report for Washington, showing growth “on
par” with traditional schools); CTR. FOR RSCH. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, STAN. UNIV., CHARTER
SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN NEW YORK 11 (2017), https://credo.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/ny_state_report_2017_06_01_final.pdf (report for New York,
showing “no difference” except for students at charters governed by a charter management
organization).
215 See U. OF CHI. CONSORTIUM ON SCH. RSCH., CHICAGO’S CHARTER HIGH SCHOOLS:
ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES, ENROLLMENT, SCHOOL TRANSFERS, AND STUDENT PERFORMANCE
45
fig.21
(2017),
https://consortium.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/201810/Chicagos%20Charter%20High%20Schools-Nov2017-Consortium.pdf.
216 See Albert Cheng et al., “No Excuses” Charter Schools: A Meta-Analysis of the
Experimental Evidence on Student Achievement, 11 J. SCH. CHOICE 209, 210 (2017).
217 See Philip M. Gleason et al., Do KIPP Schools Boost Student Achievement, 9 EDUC. FIN.
& POL’Y 36, 37 (2014) (detailing conclusions of empirical analysis of KIPP schools).
218 See Frederico R. Waitoller et al., The Irony of Rigor:“No-Excuses Charter Schools at the
Intersections of Race and Disability”, 32 INT’L J. QUALITATIVE STUD. EDUC. 282, 283 (2019)
(recounting critiques of “no-excuses” charter schools).
219 See Philip M. Gleason, Let the Search Continue: Charter Schools and the Public Interest,
38 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1053, 1055 (2019) (discussing studies that have found positive
impacts of charter schools in urban areas).
220 See Maria Paino et al., The Closing Door: The Effect of Race on Charter School Closures,
60 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 747, 748 (2017) (arguing that the likelihood of charter school
closing increases with the proportion of black students in the school).
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schools and screening out racial and ethnic minorities,221 the evidence for such claims
is mixed.222
The evidence regarding what actually happens inside charter schools is similarly
mixed. Given their comparative organizational autonomy, one might expect a
significant amount of variation at the school level in ways that are tailored to
communities that consider those schools as viable options. On one hand, charter
schools have implemented certain innovations, such as use of technology for distance
learning223 and extended time in school.224 On the other hand, researchers have found
that there is little in charter schools that has not been piloted in the traditional school
system.225 So, while charter schools have proven to be a popular and politically
feasible education reform strategy, they highlight the limits of simply devolving
governance authority to the local level and are by no means a sure thing for improving
educational equity and, in some cases, might exacerbate it.
IV. PRINCIPLES FOR RETHINKING EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Since at least Brown v. Board of Education, large-scale efforts to equalize and
improve students’ learning opportunities have become a centerpiece of domestic law
and policy reforms. However, for all the time and energy devoted to such efforts, their
outcomes have been limited or mixed at best. While each of these efforts have faced
unique challenges, thorny issues related to educational governance span across them
all. In addition to the challenges of horizontal governance, challenges of vertical
governance that have been highlighted by educational research but often missed by
legal scholars loom large as well. More efficacious education reform should be
strategically designed to account for both types of governance challenges.
While many recommendations make much sense from a purely legal or
educational perspective, this Article argues that both are needed to have any prospect
of making critical improvements at the classroom and student level at scale with any
kind of consistency. This Part accordingly draws on both perspectives to lay out two
principles for rethinking educational governance to promote more effective
approaches for increasing and equalizing students’ learning opportunities. This Part
also discusses the development of an “educational improvement infrastructure” as a
way to integrate these principles and put them into action.

221 See HENIG, supra note 205, at 95–101 (reporting research findings on the interactions of
charter school policies with racial and ethnic minority students).
222 See Tomas Monarrez et al., Do Charter Schools Increase Segregation?, EDUC. NEXT,
https://www.educationnext.org/do-charter-schools-increase-segregation-first-nationalanalysis-reveals-modest-impact/ (July 24, 2019) (arguing that the current empirical evidence
fails to provide a definitive answer about the impact of charter schools on segregation).
223 See HENIG, supra note 205, at 113 (discussing the expanded classroom time in KIPP
charter schools).
224 See Kevin Brady et al., Uncharted Territory: The Current Legal Landscape of Public
Cyber Charter Schools, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 191, 194–98 (providing an overview of the
cyber charter school landscape).
225 See HENIG, supra note 205, at 114 (stating that charter schools produce innovations much
less than many argue).
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Account for Strengths and Weaknesses of Governmental Institutions

A careful analysis of the history of large-scale education reform highlights the
importance of attending to the strengths and weaknesses of governmental institutions
spearheading reform. On one level, effective reform in this area must be able to cut
through the dense political thicket that inevitably surrounds it. As efforts focused on
reforming school funding and the education of students with disabilities starkly reflect,
such reform can be costly and involve redistribution of resources. It often involves
efforts focused on educational improvement for poor and minority groups that have
been long underserved and often lack political power. Educational reformers have
long looked to the courts precisely because they offer a viable alternative to the
political process. Moreover, such a recognition has spurred legal academics to
recommend reforms like a federal right to an education, which can provide courts with
more solid legal grounding to act. Indeed, some recent cases like those focused on a
right of access to literacy have focused directly on the establishment of such a right.
On the other hand, effective educational reform must also be grounded in expertise
and spearheaded by institutions with the capacities to manage complex educational
issues that vary and change over time. Acting alone, courts demonstrably lack these
critical capacities and have sometimes underscored their own limitations by looking
to legal principles like those governing political questions. Legislative and executive
institutions have the capacities to manage more complex problems, but as their efforts
with test-based accountability and the education of students with disabilities reflect,
they too have faced challenges in designing effective education reform. At the same
time, abdicating responsibility to manage reform to more local entities like charter
schools has proven problematic as well.
Strategically accounting for the strengths and weaknesses of these governmental
institutions in large-scale education reform likely requires a careful blend of
institutions. As the most effective attempts at school finance reform reflect, “noncourt-centric” reform, which positions the courts as agenda-setters and monitors of
reform, in addition to serving as a venue for ongoing communication with
stakeholders, can serve as a useful starting point.226 Taking this stance, courts can
require legislatures and other necessary institutions to engage with the specifics of
reform while ensuring that reforms are responsive to changes across locales and
variations over time. Given that such a role is far from the norm in educational reform
cases, judicial willingness to oversee such a process over time would be critical. Still,
even if such a strategic approach to horizontal governance is adopted, there is little
guarantee of success. This approach would only help set the conditions for effective
reform, which is more directly undertaken by the range of organizations and
institutions involved in the vertical governance process.
B.

Design Education Reform Strategies that Account for Local Variation

As an examination of major, large-scale education reform strategies reveals,
effective vertical governance is not a matter of simply setting up a system that allows
for the enactment of clear and concise mandates by governmental institutions that can
be implemented with fidelity. A long line of education research has clearly revealed

226 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 69, at 1055 (“The judge’s role changes from that of
directly determining the merits to facilitating a process of deliberation and negotiation among
the stakeholders.”).
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that education policy implementation and success are the products of complex
interactions among policies, people, and places.227 For effective reform to occur at
various levels—from governmental institutions to ground-level practitioners—
individual implementers like teachers and school administrators should be viewed as
professionals who actively make decisions based on both broader goals and rules, and
the varied and changing contexts around them. Educators have demonstrated a
remarkable ability to operate in environments rife with conflicting policies. It is worth
recalling education Professor Bryk’s contention that education reform should “move
away from simplistic thinking about solution in terms of ‘What Works?’ toward a
more realistic appraisal of ‘what works, for whom, and under what conditions?’”228
At the same time, effective vertical governance is not a matter of simply providing
local educators and administrators with as much freedom as possible. The expansion
of charter schools is perhaps the approach most strongly grounded in this theory of
action, but as educational research also reveals, being more “hands-off” does not
necessarily result in educational improvement with any consistency at scale—it
ignores key issues of individual and organizational capacity to improve instruction.229
Indeed, the more modest instructional reform policies that have been successful have
often been responsive to problems faced by practitioners at the ground level, offered
solutions, and provided tools, guidance, and resources.230 As such, the success of
educational reform likely relies on the thoughtful consideration of how individuals
and organizations at various levels have the ability and decision-making power to
productively adapt educational reforms to their local settings.
The importance of local actors in addition to governmental institutions is precisely
why such a key piece of effective educational reform is framed in terms of vertical
governance instead of merely policy implementation. Thoughtful strategies for
improving instruction should be developed and implemented at local levels to account
for variation, but they also should be aligned with broader goals, reflective of
educational research, and overseen by governmental institutions, particularly given
the imperative to improve educational equity. Integrating a focus on both horizontal
and vertical governance into education reform efforts is critical for any educational
reform effort, no matter the sub-domain of education in which that reform occurs.

227 See Meredith I. Honig, Complexity and Policy Implementation: Challenges and
Opportunities for the Field, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN EDUCATION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 1
(Meredith I. Honig ed., 2006) (highlighting the variation necessarily inherent in policy
implementation).
228 See BRYK ET AL., supra note 45, at 13–14.
229 See Dorothy Shipps et al., The Politics of Urban School Reform: Legitimacy, City Growth,
and School Improvements in Chicago, 13 EDUC. POL’Y 518, 542 (1999) (arguing that the
efficacy of education reforms focused only on governance can be limited when they devote little
attention to developing educators’ skills and knowledge).
230 See David K. Cohen & Jal D. Mehta, Why Reform Sometimes Succeeds: Understanding
the Conditions That Produce Reforms That Last, 54 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 644, 646–47 (2017)
(analyzing successful reform in policy areas including Advanced Placement, International
Baccalaureate, and Montessori).
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Develop Educational Improvement Infrastructure

While one could imagine any number of ways to integrate principles of effective
horizontal and vertical governance into educational reform, the idea of educational
infrastructure is particularly useful for conceptualizing how such integration might
look. As educational researcher William Penuel argued, targeting infrastructure rather
than innovations in isolation can help provide more capacity to produce a “more
reliable strategy for promoting transformational change in educational systems.”231
While educational researchers have conceived the development of such infrastructure
largely at local levels to support improvements in teaching and learning, the concept
could usefully be attuned to the challenges of both horizontal and vertical governance.
If courts are to be key institutions driving educational reform because of their
ability to cut through the political thicket, they require help understanding the notion
of productive adaptation and how to ensure that it is being operationalized in the
educational systems they ultimately oversee. Certain tools are already available for
courts to more readily employ in education reform cases to help them understand the
nature of effective reform as highlighted by educational research. For example, courts
have sometimes appointed expert panels, ordered additional fact finding or
negotiations among parties, or appointed “special masters” to provide them with
additional knowledge relevant to complex cases.232 Given courts’ limitations with
understanding research, independent research institutions could be created to help
courts better understand and rule on legal issues related to educational reform.233 Such
institutions could particularly help the courts in their role as agenda setters that manage
the process of developing an educational improvement infrastructure that spans
vertically across governmental levels while maintaining a focus on educational equity.
The vertical educational improvement infrastructure would be directly aimed at
creating and implementing educational reform strategies responsive to varying local
conditions—the sort of capacity developed “through intentional efforts to develop
organizational routines and processes that help innovations travel through a
system.”234 Indeed, these are precisely the sorts of capacity-building efforts that
would promote the use of tools, guidance, and resources shown to be effective for
promoting reform. Such infrastructure development efforts would not be aimed at
promoting a specific type of reform, but instead the conditions for continuous

231 William R. Penuel, Co-Design as Infrastructuring with Attention to Power: Building
Collective Capacity for Equitable Teaching and Learning through Design-Based
Implementation Research, in COLLABORATIVE CURRICULUM DESIGN FOR SUSTAINABLE
INNOVATION AND TEACHER LEARNING 387, 388 (Jules Pieters et al. eds., 2019).
232 See Rebell and Hughes, supra note 30, at 1150.
233 Some commentators have specifically suggested the creation of independent research
institutions to help courts understand issues of science and technology. See, e.g., Jason Tashea,
Courts Need Help When It Comes to Science and Tech, ABA J. (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/courts_need_help_when_it_comes_to_scienc
e_and_tech (analyzing courts’ lack of capacities to deal effectively with scientific evidence).
234 See William R. Penuel et al., Organizing Research and Development at the Intersection
of Learning, Implementation, and Design, 40 EDUC. RES. 331, 334 (2011).
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improvement as local situations change.235 At the school and district levels,
improvement plans would be useful vehicles for articulating what sort of infrastructure
would be useful. State plans, historically used in response to statutes like the ESEA
that require states to spend money for particular purposes, would similarly be useful
to detail how districts and schools would be required to structure their infrastructure
development plans and implement educational improvement strategies inside this
infrastructure. State or federal departments of education would then need to approve
such plans and ensure that localities are being held responsible for implementing them
robustly. While such accountability for state plans has not always been the norm,236
courts, acting in their role as agenda setters and managers of reform, could help ensure
that states perform this function, particularly with the help of research institutions to
keep the process aligned with educational research.
Still, it is clear that such large-scale reform is sure to be costly. Two examples
discussed here, NCLB and the IDEA, demonstrate the yawn between the money
provided by the federal government to local districts for the purpose of a reform and
the actual costs incurred by districts to try to meet the laws’ respective objectives.
Indeed, as discussed throughout this Article, shortfalls of federal funding tied to
specific statutory requirements have impacted local school district budgets to varying
degrees.237 Forcing some discussion concerning the actual costs—and impact on local
district budgets—may focus some attention on how a desired large-scale reform as it
travels through vertical governance structures.
V. CONCLUSION
Large-scale education reform is not easy. While an examination of major education
reform efforts reveals critical successes, honest evaluations also reveal far too many
failures. An analysis of some of the major reform efforts reveals that problems of
educational governance drive some of the fundamental problems that these reforms
have faced. Without addressing such problems head on—without attending to issues
of both horizontal and vertical governance from the very inception of education reform
efforts—it is unlikely that future reform efforts will prove significantly more
successful. Doing so would require integrating lessons from both legal and educational
research in a way that fully accounts for both the characteristics of governmental
institutions and the educational system more broadly. Such a reconceptualization is
critical for educational reform efforts to move forward in a way that has not only the
potential to make changes at the level of law and policy, but in students’ learning
opportunities and performance as well.

235 See MARK A. SMYLIE, CONTINUOUS SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT 2 (2009) (explaining the call
for schools to adopt organizational properties and processes of continuous improvement).
236 See, e.g., SUPERFINE, supra note 3, at 91 (discussing problems in implementation and
accountability of Title I funds, including buying color televisions instead of enhancing school
instructional programs); id. at 116 (discussing how the federal government allowed states to
continue receiving Goals 2000 funds even without submitting plans to the federal government).
237 See, e.g., supra notes 128 and 143.
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